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JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over appeals from the district 
court review of the adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the 
State, pursuant to Section 78-2a-2(b)(i), Utah Code Ann.(1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue No, 1. Res Judicata, Are the claims of the Property Owners precluded 
by the collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) branch of res judicata? 
Issue No, 2. Nonconforming Use, Is a cease and desist order issued in March 
1996 sufficient evidence alone to establish the existence of a prior nonconforming use 
for the change in ordinance which occurred in 1998? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The first issue listed above involves legal conclusions of the trial court. On an 
appeal from a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court reviews the trial court's 
legal conclusions for correctness and grants them no deference.1 
The standard of review on the second issue, whether the trial court erred in 
granting summary judgment confirming the determination of the Board of Adjustment 
on the issue of entitlement to nonconforming use is reviewed for correctness.2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellants3 own three homes in residential neighborhoods in Sandy. At 
1
 Petersen v. South Salt Lake City, 987 P.2d 57,1999 UT 93, Workman v. Brighton 
Properties, Inc., 976 2d 1209, 1210 (Utah 1999) 
2
 Hugoe v. Woods Cross City, 988 P.2d 456,1999 Ut.App. 281 ^20 
3
 Herein called "Property Owners'1, "Owners", or the "Collinses" 
1 
various times in the last four years they claim to have rented these properties for periods 
of less than 30 days, which are referred to herein as "short-term" or "ski" rentals. Sandy 
City ordinances prohibit such uses. The Property Owners claim such ordinances should 
not apply them; they want their properties to be "grandfathered" as nonconforming uses. 
The Sandy City board of Adjustment and the district court ruled that the Owners have no 
such right. The Owners have appealed these decisions.4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On March 26,1996, a Sandy City zoning code enforcement officer, Nolan 
Isom, sent a Notice and Order to the property owner, John Collins, directing him to stop 
operating three homes as transitory lodging facilities in violation of Sandy ordinances.5 
2. The Property Owners filed an appeal to the Sandy City Board of Adjustment 
from the determination of the City that the use of the three properties as short-term rental 
units was prohibited by the Sandy City Development Code. They also included in their 
appeal an additional property which had not been the subject of the cease and desist 
order, the property at 9255 South Maison Drive.6 
4
 A fourth property, which was also the subject of the previous litigation is no longer an 
issue before the court, since the Owners apparently no longer own it: the 1456 E. 
Longdate Drive home. 
5
 The subject properties were single family dwellings located at 1875 East Alia Panna 
Way, 1456 E. Longdale Drive, and 472 East 9400 South, in Sandy, Utah in residential 
zoning districts A copy of the Notice and Order is attached hereto as Tab No. 1. 
6
 R. at 156. The record before the Board of Adjustment in 1996 contains no mention of 
the fact that the 9255 South Maison Drive property had not actually been the subject of 
the cease and desist order, which was apparently overlooked by the Board in its decision, 
which thus applied to that property as well. 
2 
3. At the Board of Adjustment hearing, held August 8,1996, eleven residents 
from the neighborhoods where the homes were located, testified as to various 
complaints about the use of the Collins' properties as "ski rentals".7 After hearing the 
evidence and arguments from the residents and the Owners, the Board of Adjustment 
ruled that the City's interpretation of its ordinances was correct and denied the appeal.1 
7
 Among the complaints expressed about the plaintiffs' use of their properties at the 
August 1996 Board of Adjustment hearing were the following: 
(a) Poor upkeep (Aug. 8,1996 Bd. of Adj. Minutes at 11, R. at 273); 
(b) Failure to shovel snow off of sidewalks, in one case for four weeks (1997 Bd 
of Adj. Minutes at p. 12, R. at 274) about which Mr. Collins responded that if tenants 
wish, they can shovel snow, and that tenants do shovel snow (Id. at 9); 
(c) Short-term rentals will lower the property values of the neighborhood (Id. at 
10,11) (R. at 273); 
(d) Traffic problems (Id. at 11), and a fear for the safety of children (Minutes at p. 
12, R. at 273); 
(e) There was no on-site management of the guests at the rental homes as there 
would be at a motel (Id. at 12, R. at 273); 
(f) Partying and loud music on weekends late into the night at properties where 
many beer cans were viewed (Id. at 11,13R. at 273,275); 
(g) Not knowing whom to contact when there were complaints about the 
properties (Id. at p. 13, R. at 276); 
(h) As many as nine cars at one of the Owners' properties (Id. at 13, R. at 275), 
although John Collins stated he limits the number of cars allowed in his rental agreements 
(Id. at p. 9, R. at 271) to only two or three cars at any of the rental homes (Id. at P. 10, R. 
at 272); 
(i) Allowing one of the properties to be rented violated restrictive covenants 
requiring that the buildings be used only for "a single family dwelling" for the subdivision 
in which sits, and that the plaintiffs were aware of these covenants, which was supported 
by a letter signed by many of the residents and read at the hearing (Id. at p. 11, R. at 273 ). 
A copy of the minutes of that meeting are attached hereto as Tab no 2. 
81996 Bd. of Adj. Minutes at 14, Tab 2 R. at 276. Findings of fact and conclusions 
were not adopted by the Board in that proceeding. 
3 
4. Owners filed a complaint with the Third District Court appealing the decision 
of the Sandy Board of Adjustment. The properties listed in the Amended Complaint9 
omitted the property at 9255 South Maison Drive. 
5. The district court, Judge Frank G. Noel, granted the City's motion for 
summary judgment and denied Owners' motion for summary judgment.10 For reasons 
of economy, Owners did not appeal the court's decision.11 
6. On March 26,1998, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its opinion in another 
case involving short-term rentals in Sandy, Brown et al v. Sandy City Board of 
Adjustment}2 In that case the court held that Sandy City its zoning ordinances did not 
prohibit rentals of less than 30 days in residential districts, but that the City could 
prohibit such uses if the it adopted an ordinance specifically forbidding them. 
7. The Sandy City Council thereupon adopted an ordinance prohibiting short-
term rentals of 30 days or less in all residential districts in Sandy.13. 
8. Owners sought to avoid the new ordinance by filing an application for 
nonconforming use status with the Sandy City Board of Adjustment on October 27, 
1998. This application was for three properties located at the following addresses: 1875 
East Alia Panna Way, 472 East 9400 South, and 9255 South Maison Drive.14 
9
 Amended Complaint, R. at 174. 
10
 Revised Summary Judgment and Order of Dismissal, R. at 210. 
11
 See November 12,1998 Bd. of Adj. Minutes at 3, Tab 7 ; see also Brief of Appellants 
a t l l 
12957P.2d207 
13
 R. at 214,219, 224. 
14
 Record at 132. The property at 1456 E. Longdate Drive was not brought to the 
Board of Adjustment or subsequently to the district court, apparently because Owners 
4 
9. On November 12,1998 the Sandy City Board of Adjustment held a hearing 
on the application for nonconforming use status. The Board denied Owners' request for 
nonconforming use status, finding (1) that the Owners had not used the properties as 
short-term rentals on the effective date of the new ordinance prohibiting short-term 
rentals15, and (2) that the decision in Brown did not apply to the Owners inasmuch as 
they had not appealed the earlier decision of the district court.16 
10. The Owners petitioned the district court for a review of the decision of the 
Board of Adjustment. On August 16,1999, the court held a hearing on the parties' cross 
motions for summary judgment, and on November 18,1999, Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
granted summary judgment for the City.17 
had sold the home. 
15
 No evidence was submitted by the Owners to show that they were using the properties 
for short-term rentals when the new ordinance went into effect in 1998. Para. 11, Sandy 
Bd. of Adj. Findings of Fact and Conclusions, R. at 240. 
16
 R. at 240. 
17
 R. at 446. 
5 
A summary of the procedural history is set out below in table form showing the 
Owners' four properties.18 
| PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
EVENT 
[Made a Subject of City's March 1996 Cease and Desist Order 
Subject of the Aug. 1996 Bd. of Adj. Decision 
Appealed Bd. of Adj. decision to 3rd Dist Court 
J Subject of the 1996 3rd Dist. Court Case 
Appealed to Utah Court of Appeals (1996 Case) 
Property Sold to Different Owner 
1998 Bd of Adj. Application for Nonconforming Use 
1 Subject of 1998 3rd Dist. Court Petition for Review 
II Appealed to Utah Court of Appeals 
1975 E. 
Alia 
Panna 
• 
• 
• 
• 
No 
• 
• 
•_____ 
472 
East 
9400 
South 
• 
• 
• 
• 
No 
• 
• 
[_.._• 
1456 E. 
Longdale 
Drive19 
• 
• 
• 
• 
No 
- • 
No 
I No 
[_;NO_ 
9255 S. 
Maison 
Drive 
No 
• 
No 
No 
No 
• 
• 
• 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Owners did not appeal the adverse decisions with respect to all three of their 
properties. They didn't appeal the decision of the Sandy Board of Adjustment in 1996 with 
respect to the Maison Drive property. Later they did not appeal the 1996 district court 
18
 The dark bar indicates the point at which the Petitioners stopped appealing each 
property. 
19
 This property was not the subject of the 1998 Board of Adjustment proceedings, was 
not appealed to the District Court, and is not involved in this case, as shown by the 
graying of the column. It is shown here because it was involved in the 1996 Board of 
Adjustment and district court proceedings. 
6 
decision with respect to their other two homes located at 1875 East Alia Panna Way and 
472 East 9400South. Collateral estoppel now precludes them from relitigating these cases. 
The Property Owners maintain that the 1998 decision of the Utah Court of Appeals 
in Brown v. Sandy City Board of Adjustment,10 another home ski rental case, precludes 
application of collateral estoppel to them, because it is an intervening change in law. In 
fact, there was no law established on this interpretation of Sandy's ordinances; Brown was a 
case of first impression. It was not, therefore a change in law, as the Owners claim. The 
Collinses should have appealed the former district court case if they believed it was 
incorrect. The rule is well established that where a party has foregone an available appeal, 
an intervening court decision will not allow the resurrection of the same issue in a 
subsequent suit. The Property Owners have not cited any authority to the contrary. Any 
other rule would allow the endless relitigation of cases by dissatisfied parties. 
The applicant for a nonconforming use bears the burden of showing he is entitled to 
it, and that he was using the properties as short-term rentals on the date the zoning 
ordinance prohibiting such use became effective. There is no evidence of a substantial 
short-term rental use at any time on any of these parcels at any time, much less in 1998 
when the new ordinance became effective. The Property Owners relied solely on the 
intervening decision in Brown argue for the nonconforming use status for their properties, 
and the Notice and Order from the City's zoning enforcement officer, asserting that these 
alone are sufficient to establish their use. 
957 P.2d 207 
7 
The Notice and Order is too slender a thread on which to carry a nonconforming 
use: it doesn't refer to the Maison Drive property at all. It did refer to the other two 
properties, but says nothing about the historical inception date, nature, or scope of any such 
uses sufficient to show any pattern or scope of use prior to the time they stopped using the 
properties. The rule in most jurisdictions in the United States is that substantial operations 
are needed to establish a nonconforming use; not only must there have been some actual 
nonconforming operations, but these must have been substantial in quantity. The Owners 
expected the Board, the trial court, and now this court to accept their illogical assumption 
that because a zoning officer believed in 1996 that they were renting some of their homes, 
that this is sufficient to demonstrate that they would have such a use in 1998 when the 
zoning ordinances were changed to disallow such use. There was no evidence to support 
this position. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE OWNERS' CLAIMS ARE PRECLUDED 
BY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 
Utah recognizes two branches of res judicata, namely claim preclusion and issue 
preclusion, more properly called collateral estoppel,21 each of which promotes the important 
judicial policy of preventing parties from relitigating a claim or issue.22 In order for the 
relitigation of an issue to be barred in another action, four requirements must be met: 
First, the issue in both cases must be identical. Second, the judgment must be final 
with respect to that issue. Third, the issue must have been fiilly, fairly, and 
21
 Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988) 
22
 Office of Recovery Serv. v. V.G.P., 845 P.2d 944 (Ct. App. 1992) 
8 
competently litigated in the first action. Fourth, the party who is precluded from 
litigating the issue must be either a party to the first a'ction or a privy of a party.23 
A. The Essential Issue in the 1996 Collins District Court Case And The 
1998 District Court Case Was the Same, 
The central issue in Owners' first (1996) appeal to the Board of Adjustment24, 
and in the appeal which followed to the district court25 was whether the Property Owners' 
short-term rentals were lawful.26 The legality of the Owners' short-term rentals was also 
essential to their subsequent application for legal nonconforming use status in 1998. 
The Owners maintain that issues in the 1996 and 1998 cases are different because 
the issue in the latter case was whether the Owners were entitled to a nonconforming use. 
They avoid the fact that to qualify for a nonconforming use, the applicant must show that 
the use was legally established and continued before the enactment or effective date of the 
restrictive legislation.27 When the Owners failed to appeal the Board of Adjustment and the 
23
 Madsen, id., at 247 
24
 The Application to Bd. of Adj. clearly states that the issue is the alleged error in 
interpreting the City's ordinances. June 27,1996 letter from Franklin L. Slaugh to Sandy 
City Bd. of Adj. at 1, R. at 162. See also Amended Complaint f6, R. at 175. 
25
 The central issue in the 1996 district court case was the interpretation of the City's 
ordinances to prohibit short-term rentals. Amended Complaint, fflf 7,10, R. at 175,176. 
Plaintiffs also raised the claim in the appeal to district court that the City's ordinances 
were unconstitutionally vague, Amended Complaint, [^8, R. at 175. But, under the "same 
evidence" test, causes of action asserting different theories of recovery may be considered 
the same for res judicata purposes if the same operative facts give rise to the assertions. 
See American Estate Management Corp. v. International Investment and Development 
Corp., 986 P.2d 765 (Ut. App. 1999) (A claim is an operative set of facts which may give 
rise to different legal theories.) The assertion of different theories does not prevent the 
application of res judicata. label v. Cohn, 283 111. app. 3d, 1043,1049, 670 N.E.2d 877, 
881 (1996) 
26
 See Amended Complaint, ffif 4-7 R. at 175. 
27
 See Young, 1 Anderson's American Law of Zoning (4th ed.) §6.11; See also §15-24-
2, Rev. Ord. of Sandy City which requires that a use must be lawfully existing at the time 
9 
district court decisions, their uses were finally adjudged illegal. The Collinses could not 
validly come before the Board of Adjustment in 1998 and claim, as they did, that they had 
a legal nonconforming use when the contrary had already been finally adjudicated with 
respect to those homes. "The applicability of collateral estoppel does not depend upon 
whether the claims for relief are the same in both cases: what is critical is whether the issue 
that was actually litigated in the first suit was essential to resolution of that suit and is the 
same factual issue as that raised in the second suit."28 
B. Finality. 
1. 9255 Maison Drive Property. The Board of Adjustment decision in the 1996 
case with respect to the 9255 Maison Drive home became fined when the Owners did not 
appeal to the decision on the legality of the short-term rentals as to that property to the 
Third District Court.29 Collateral estoppel applies not only to court decisions, but also to 
those of administrative bodies.30 
2. 1975 E. Alia Panna Way and 472 East 9400 South Homes. The summary 
judgment issued in the 1996 Third District Court case was final with respect to the 1975 E. 
Alia Panna Way and 472 East 9400 South homes inasmuch as it ended the controversy 
of prohibitive ordinance. 
28
 Robertson v. Campbell, 61A P.2d 1226,1230 (Utah 1983) (citing Searle Bros. v. Searle, 588 
P.2d 689, 690-91 (Utah 1978)). 
29
 §10-9-708(3), U.C.A. (1999) (petition is barred unless filed within 30 days after the 
Board of Adjustment decision.) 
30
 See Career Service Review Board v. Dept of Corrections, 942 P.2d 933, 1997 UT 
16073 at [^28 (Utah 1997). M[T]he principles of res judicata apply to enforce repose when 
an administrative agency has acted in a judicial capacity in an adversary proceeding to 
resolve a controversy over legal rights and to apply a remedy," Salt Lake Citizens v. 
Mountain States, 846 P.2d 1245, 1251, n.4 (Utah 1992) 
10 
between the parties.31 The summary judgment became a final order when not appealed 
within 30 days32 
C. Fully Litigated, Owners were represented by legal counsel, and had an 
opportunity to raise all issues they wished in the first action. 
D. Same Parties are Precluded, John and June Collins were the plaintiffs in 
all the cases at issue. 
All the requirements of issue preclusion are therefore met for each of the three 
subject properties. A judgment which is not further appealed or remanded becomes a final 
judgment on the merits.33 Once the time for appeal ran, the final judgment of the trial court 
was res judicata.34 
31
 See Salt Lake City Corp. v. Layton, 600 P.2d 538 (Utah 1979) 
32
 Rule 4(a),Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (notice of appeal from trial court 
judgment must be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days) after entry of the 
judgment). 
33
 See Sevy v. Security Title Co. of Southern Utah, 902 P2d 629,1995 Utah LEXIS 50 
(Utah 1995) " . . . [T]he court of appeals1 decision was a final judgment on the merits. 
The judgment was not further appealed or remanded, nor was it determined on the basis 
of an unrelated procedural issue." 1995 Utah LEXIS 50 at 8. (Emphasis supplied.) 
Casa Grande Trust Company v. Superior Court for the County of Pinal, 444 P.2d 521, 8 
Ariz. App. 163, 1968 Ariz. App. LEXIS 490 (Appealable trial court judgment is res 
judicata and conclusive on the parties if no appeal is taken.) 
34
 C. Wright, Miller, and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction §4433, at 
305, citing numerous U.S. Supreme Court and U.S. Court of Appeals cases. "Concededly 
the judgment in the first suit would have been binding in the subsequent one if an appeal, 
though available, had not been taken or perfected." U.S. v. Munsingwear, Inc., 71 S. Ct., 
104,106, 340 U.S. 36, 39, 95 L.Ed. 36,1950 U.S. LEXIS 1410, at 6. A litigant's choice 
not to continue to assert his rights after an intermediate court has ruled against him 
concludes the litigation as effectively as if he had proceeded all the way through the 
highest court available to him. Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 67 S.Ct 657, 91 L.Ed. 
832 (1947). See State v. Clark, 913 P.2d 360 (Utah App. 1996) (Upon failure of criminal 
defendant to perfect an appeal by filing a brief, or by petition for rehearing, the dismissal 
of the appeal became an adjudication on the merits which thereafter barred the defendant 
11 
E. An Intervening Decision by a Higher Court Does Not Revive a 
Claim Once Finally Decided Where a Party Made No Effort to 
Appeal the Earlier Decision 
The res judicata consequences of a final unappealed judgment on the merits are 
not altered by the fact that the judgment may have been wrong or rested on a legal principle 
subsequently overruled in another case.35 The established rule is that preclusion cannot be 
defeated by electing to forgo an available opportunity to appeal.36 A judgment in a prior 
suit will be binding in subsequent actions if an available appeal is not taken or perfected.37 
In Ackerman v. U.S.3*, in a case where the petitioner had not appealed a denaturalization 
judgment against him in his own case because he felt it was not worth the expense, and then 
later moved to vacate the judgment after the denaturalization judgment of his brother-in-
under the doctrine of res judicata from subsequently challenging his sentence on the same 
legal basis.) See also Career Service Review Board v. Utah, 942 P.2d 933, (Utah 1997) 
(Dept. of Corrections failed to appeal an order of the Utah Career Service Review Board, 
by which it became final, thus precluding the district court from considering the issues 
decided by the Board in its order.) 
35
 Federated Dept. Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394,101 S.Ct. 2424,69 L.Ed.2d 103 
(1981); see also Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College (Tinal order is res judicata and 
binding on parties where not appealed and not reversed on appeal, citing Federated Dept. 
Stores); Office of Recovery Services v. V.G.P., 845 P.2d 946 (Ut. App. 1992)(nonappealed 
trial court judgment barred by claim preclusion in paternity case); Copperstate Thrift & 
Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387 (Ut. App. 1987)(issue preclusion prevents relitigation of 
final order bankruptcy court even though that decision may have been incorrect). 
36
 C. Wright, Miller and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction §4433. 
"Many cases establish the rule that once the time for appeal has run, a final judgment of a 
trial court or an intermediate appellate court is res judicata without regard to the fact that 
appeal might have been taken to a higher court." Id. 
37
 U.S. v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36,39, 71 S.Ct. 104,106, 95 L.Ed. 36 (1950); see 
also Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183,189, 67 S.Ct. 657,661,91 L.Ed.832 
(1947)(failure to continue to assert one's rights after an intermediate appellate court has 
ruled against a party concludes the litigation as effectively as if he had proceeded with his 
appeal through the highest court available) 
38
 34 U.S. 193, 71 S.Ct, 209, 95 L.Ed.207 (1950) 
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law was reversed in an identical case, the Supreme Court held that further appeal was 
barred by res judicata where he had not pursued his own appeal.39 
The Property Owners made a choice not to appeal, and they cannot be relieved of 
such a choice because hindsight seems to indicate to him that his decision not to appeal was 
probably wrong. There must be an end to litigation someday, and a court will not relieve a 
party from a free calculated, deliberate choice to forego appeal.40 
A change in the judicial view of applicable law after final judgment is not a 
sufficient basis for vacating a judgment entered before the change in law by a higher court, 
where parties neglected to perfect their appeal.41 
Owners' citations of authority in their brief on the issue of whether intervening 
changes in law act as an exception to issue preclusion where a prior judgment exists are 
either inapplicable, because they involve change in fact, or intervening legislative changes 
of law, or a change in an already existing judicial decision. The instant case involved none 
of these. There were no intervening changes of fact, nor a change in legislation which 
would have allowed the use in question. Nor was there was a change injudicial decision, 
because no appellate court had yet ruled on the issue of whether Sandy City's ordinances 
39
 See also Ellis v. Whittaker, 10 Kan.App.2d 676, 709 P.2d 991 (1985) (Motion to set 
aside judgment because of subsequent change in court decisions properly denied where 
party chose not to appeal in first case), Cruickshank & Co. v. Dutuchess Shipping Co., 
Ltd., 805 F.2d 465 (1986) 
40
 Id. 34 U.S. at 198, 71 S. Ct. at 211, Lubben v. Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 
27,453 F.2d 645, 651, 652 (1st Cir. 1972) 
41
 Title v. U.S., 263 F.2d 28, 30, 31 (9th Cir. 1959) 
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prohibited short-term rentals until Brown. This was a matter of first impression when the 
Owners took it to the district court. 
Owners cite dicta from State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Duel,42 
for the general rule that res judicata is no defense where between the time of the first 
judgment and the second there has been an intervening decision or change in law altering 
the situation. A review of the authorities cited in the case do not support the Owners' 
position, however.43 Community Hospital v. Sullivan4*, also cited by Owners, involved an 
intervening legislative change as well as a change in facts, and so is inapplicable to this case 
on both counts. 
The intervening event in Farrow v. Brown45, was a change in the factual situation 
underlying the first judgment: the road easement which had been decided in the first action 
was no longer passable because of a change in the course of creek by which the road ran. 
42
 1945 S.Ct.178, 324 U.S. 154, 65 S. Ct. 573, 89 L. Ed. 812, reh. den. 324 U.S. 887, 65 
S.Ct. 856, 89 L.Ed. 1436 
43
 The Duel case cites a 1925 treatise, Freeman on Judgments, §713, which deals only 
with the effect of intervening legislative acts between the time of the first and second 
judgments where res judicata is raised as a bar in the second case, and is therefore 
inapplicable to the present case. A copy of §713 from the treatise is attached hereto as Tab 
3. None of the cases cited in Duel dealt with a claim of res judicata or collateral estoppel 
where a party failed to pursue an available appeal in the first case. Those cases deal with 
intervening changes in fact, or involved appeals of the prior cases, or dealt with 
intervening state decision involving ongoing income tax obligations, which is a special 
situation where res judicata concerns arise. Even if they were on point, the later cases of 
Ackerman and other Supreme Court cases cited herein would supercede or overrule the 
cases cited in Duel. 
44
 986 F.2d 357 (10th Cir.1993). 
45
 873 S.W.2d 918 (Mo.App. 1994) 
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The court ruled that such a change in underlying facts after the first judgment would be an 
appropriate exception to the bar of the issue preclusion. 
Board of Education v. Village ofNorthbrook46 dealt not with collateral estoppel, for 
which it is cited in Owner's brief, but with the claim preclusion branch of res judicata, and 
therefore doesn't support the point they are trying to establish - that collateral estoppel 
doesn't apply where the facts or law have substantially changed.47 The court discussed in 
the opinion changes of facts and legislation as possibilities that might bar res judicata, but 
said they didn't apply to that case.48 The court pointed out, moreover, that plaintiff-
appellant Board of Education did not appeal the trial court's ruling in the first case in 
affirming the lower court's determination that res judicata barred the second action.49 
In Statler v. Catalano, 293 111. App. 3d 483, 691 N.E.2d 384 (1997), cited by the 
Owners, the court ruled that a change of law by the Illinois Supreme Court after the first 
judgment was rendered on whether a landowner's right to use a lake partially on his 
property extended to the entire lake, including that part which is not above his property. 
But in Statler I50, the earlier case, the plaintiffs appealed the matter as far as they could to 
assert their claim on the issue of their right to use the entire lake: they appealed from the 
trial to the appellate court, and then from the appellate court to the Illinois Supreme Court 
46
 295 Ill.App.3d 909, 692 N.E.2d 1278, 230 Ill.Dec. 112 (Ill.App. 1998) 
47
 While the case does not use the term "claim preclusion", the language used throughout 
in discussing the tests and effects of res judicata ("bar", the same evidence and transaction 
tests, for instance) clearly apply only to that branch of res judicata. 
48
 Id. at 1284 
49
 Mat 1281 
50167 Ill.App.3d, 118 111. Dec. 283, 521 N.E.2d 565 (1988), cert den. 1221111.2d 595 
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where their appeal was denied. The plaintiffs in that case did not simply let their appeal 
lapse as have the Collinses in the present case. In Statler I, unlike in the present case, there 
was an existing court decision contrary to plaintiffs position in the first case , so that the 
intervening decision by the Illinois Supreme Court was a change in existing law which 
formed the basis for allowing the second case to proceed under that exception to res 
judicata. There were no written appellate decisions until the plaintiffs in the Brown case 
took up their appeal, and so there was no "change in law" - Brown was, of course, the first 
appellate court decision on the point.51 
The Restatement of Judgments, Second, says, on the changed conditions rule,52 
which allows, in certain instances, that a judgment be set aside or modified [set out here by 
footnote the entire Sec. 73], 
The rule has been construed as also apply to a situation where a 
subsequent judicial decision changes the law that was applied in 
reaching an earlier judgment, but this seems a misinterpretation of the 
The Illinois Supreme Court case which changed the law on whether an owner of part 
of a private lake had a right to the use of the entire lake, Beacham v. Lake Zurich Property 
Owners Assn., 123 111. 2d 227, 527 N.E.2d 154,122 111. Dec. 14 (1988), was the basis for 
denying the res judicata effect of Statler /, Id. In Beacham the court said that the issue on 
the right of a private owner to use the entire lake was one of first impression. The Illinois 
Supreme Court had, however, denied the appeal of Plaintiffs in Statler I, therefore 
confirming the decision of the Illinois Court of Appeals whose decision was therefore the 
law of the state on the issue of use of a lake until Beacham. 
52
 §73. Changed Conditions 
Subject to the limitations stated in § 74, a judgment may be set aside or 
modified if: 
(1) The judgment was subject to modification by its own terms or by applicable 
law, and events have occurred subsequent to the judgment that warrant 
modification of the contemplated kind; or 
(2) There has been such a substantial change in the circumstances that giving 
continued effect to the judgment is unjust. 
16 
rule and a very unsound policy. If it were adopted it is not clear why 
all judgments rendered on the basis of a particular interpretation of the 
law should not be reopened when the interpretation is substantially 
changed.53 
Owners request that the interests in repose and reliance upon judgments be thrown out 
simply because other litigants who expended the time and effort to pursue an appeal, had 
the Court of Appeals clarify the law. The Owners' position overlooks the effect that such a 
change would have on those who have relied upon the decisions at earlier stages on these 
properties - the homeowner who would have sold to move away from a home where 
different transient tenants were there every week and might have sold in a favorable market 
and didn't; or the family which bought a home near one of these ski houses based on the 
earlier unappealed decisions of the Board of Adjustment and Court of Appeals. As Wright, 
Miller and Cooper say in their treatise on civil procedure on the problems of expanding the 
exceptions to res judicata based on intervening changes of law or fact, "If issue preclusion 
is to mean anything, such reliance should be protected."54 Property rights are one of the areas 
where the interests in reliance and repose are particularly compelling, and where the protections of 
issue preclusion should be maintained.55 
Justice Harlan of the U.S. Supreme Court said that the object for which civil courts 
have been established in our society is to secure the peace and repose of the community by 
53
 Restatement of Judgments, Second §73, Comment (b) at 200 
54
 C.Wright, Miller, and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, §4425 at 252. 
55
 When . . . title to real property is at issue, the need for finality is at its apex." 
American Estate Management Corp. v. International Investment and Development Corp., 
986 P.2d 765 (Ut. App. 1999); See Farrell v. Brown, 729 P.2d 1090,1093 (Idaho Ct. 
App. 1986); 18 Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4408, at 65 
(1981); C. Wright, Miller and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §4425 at 252. 
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the settlement of matters which can be determined by judicial administration, and that the 
enforcement of judgments is essential to the maintenance of social order.56 But for such 
enforcement, the assistance of the courts would not be sought in resolving disputes.57 One 
of the central objectives of our modern system of civil procedure is putting an end to 
litigation by according finality to judgments.58 The established rule is that preclusion 
cannot be defeated by electing to forgo an available opportunity to appeal.59 Once the time 
for appeal has run, a judgment is res judicata without regard to the fact that an appeal might 
have been taken to a higher court.60 
II. THE APPELLANTS HAVE NOT SHOWN THAT THEY 
QUALIFY FOR A NONCONFORMING USE ON ANY 
OF THE PROPERTIES 
Sandy City enacted an ordinance on nonconforming uses under authority granted 
by the State legislature61. The ordinance grants authority to the Board of Adjustment to 
determine nonconforming uses62 In order to establish a nonconforming use, the person 
56
 Southern Pacific R.R. v. U.S., 168 U.S. 1, 48,18 S.Ct. 18, 27, 42 L.Ed. 355 (1897) 
57
 Id. 
58
 Marcus, Redish, Sherman, Civil Procedure: A Modem Approach (2nd ed.) at 1091 Each 
branch promotes the important judicial policy of preventing parties from relitigating a 
claim or issue. 
59
 C. Wright, Miller and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §4433 at 305 
60
 Id. 
61 ,fThe legislative body may provide in any zoning ordinance or amendment for: (a) the 
establishment, restoration, reconstruction, extension, alteration, expansion, or substitution 
of nonconforming uses upon the terms and conditions set orth in the zoning ordinance." 
U.C.A., §10-9-408(2)(a). "The Board of Adjustment shall make determinations regarding 
the existence, expansion, or modification of a nonconforming use." §15-5-5, Rev. Ord. of 
Sandy City (R.O.S.C.) 
62
 "The legislative body may provide in any zoning ordinance or amendment for: (a) the 
establishment, restoration, reconstruction, extension, alteration, expansion, or substitution 
of nonconforming uses upon the terms and conditions set orth in the zoning ordinance." 
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applying for a nonconforming use must show that the use existed at the time of the 
enactment of ordinance prohibiting the activity;63 that the use was in effect on the date of 
the adoption of the zoning restriction which made the use nonconforming.64 The applicant 
for a nonconforming use must do more than just show that the use at issue existed at some 
time prior to the enactment of the restrictive ordinance: the use must have existed on the 
day when the ordinance took effect.65 If the use was not in existence on the date in 
question, then the claimed use is not protected.66 
The public policy cited in court decisions and in municipal ordinances, whether 
explicitly stated or not, is to restrict and eventually eliminate nonconforming uses.67 
U.C.A., §10-9-408(2)(a). "The Board of Adjustment shall make determinations regarding 
the existence, expansion, or modification of a nonconforming use." §15-5-5, Rev. Ord. of 
Sandy City (R.O.S.C.) 
63
 City ordinances define a nonconforming use as a "use which lawfully occupied a 
building or land at the time this Code became effective and which does not now conform 
with the use regulations. § 15-2-2, R.O.S.C. See Young, Anderson's American Law of 
Zoning, (4th ed.) §6.10. See Williams, 44 American Land Planning Law, §110.01 (Rev. 
1986) and cases cited therein. 
64
 Young, Anderson fs American Law of Zoning, (4th ed.) §6.10. See Williams, 44 
American Land Planning Law, §110.01 (Rev. 1986) and cases cited therein. 
65
 Ashley v. Bedford, 160 Ind. App. 634, 312 NE2d 863 (1974), Lipsitz v. City of 
Baltimore, 150 A.2d 259 (Md. App. 1959) (evidence not sufficient to show that the 
property had been occupied by five families on the critical date.) 
66
 1 K. Young, Anderson's American Law of Zoning, (4th ed.) §6.10 
67
 "It is the purpose of these regulations to control and gradually eliminate those uses of 
land or buildings, which although legal at the time of their establishment, do not now 
conform to the use regulations of the district within which they are situated... This 
Chapter is also established to control and gradually eliminate sites and lots which were 
legal at the time of their establishment, but no longer meet the regulations of the district 
within they are located." Section 15-24-1, R.O.S.C. Nonconforming uses should be 
restricted, decreased, and eventually eliminated. 1. K.Young, Anderson's American Law 
of Zoning, (4th ed.) §6.07 at 501. "The spirit of zoning ordinances always has been and 
still is to diminish and decease nonconforming uses.. . and to that end municipalities have 
employed various approved regulatory methods..." Hoffman v. Kinealy, 389 S.W.2d 745 
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Nonconforming uses limit the effectiveness of land use controls and are partially 
responsible for the blight which has infected many urban areas.68 Municipal attorneys,69 
urban planners,70 and law review commentators71 agree that nonconforming uses imperil the 
success of community plans and injure property values. 
A. There is No Substantial Evidence that a Short-term Use Even Existed, 
The Property Owners claim they used the subject properties for short-term rentals in 
1996, and discontinued their use only because they were served with a cease and desist 
order that year.72 The Order73 states in pertinent part as follows: 
Dear Mr. Collins: 
I have determined that you are operating a business, a transitory lodging 
facility at the above referenced location. This letter is to notify you that doing 
so is a violation of the Sandy City Business License ordinance Section 5-1-1 
and the Land Development code, chapter 15-7. Each day of operation may be 
a separate violation. 
(Mo. 1965). The ultimate purpose of zoning is gradually to eliminate nonconforming 
uses. Wilson v. Edgar, 64 Cal. App. 654, 222 P 623 (1923). "Nonconforming uses are a 
thorn in the side of proper zoning and should not be perpetuated any longer than 
necessary. The policy of zoning is to abolish nonconforming uses as speedily as justice 
will permit." Windham v. Sprague, 219 A.2d 548 (Me. 1966). 
6 81 K. Young, Anderson's American Law of Zoning (4th ed.) §6.02 at 485 
69
 Messer, Nonconforming Uses, Municipalities and the Law in Action (1951), at 347. 
70
 Lewis, A New Zoning Plan for the District of Columbia (1956), at 12 
71
 Young, "Regulation and Removal of Nonconforming Uses," 12 Western Reserve L. R. 
at 681 (1961); Comment, 7 Baylor L. R. 73 (1955); Comment, 102 University ofPenn. 
L.R. 91 (1953); "Summary of Utah Law: Land Use, Zoning and Eminent Domain," 
B.Y.U. J. of Legal Studies, 151 (1979) 
72
 Brief of Appellant's at 14. 
73
 Tab no. 1,R. at 155. 
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The Owners did not introduce any evidence of nonconforming use before the Board of 
Adjustment, except for the Order.74 Rather, the Owners say simply that "it is undisputed 
that the [Owners] would have continued to use their properties as short-term rental units 
had the cease and desist order not been served upon them on March 26, 1996."75 In fact, 
the City and the Board do dispute this issue. There is no evidence of a substantial short-
term rental use at any time on any of these parcels. The Notice and Order was only directed 
to two of the three subject homes.76 
More importantly, the Notice and Order fails to establish the historical inception 
date, nature, or extent of any prior use of the properties.. The Order only mentioned the 
properties at 1875 East Alia Panna Way, 472 East 9400 South, andl456 East Longdale 
Drive: The property at 9255 South Maison Drive was the address to which the order was 
The City's attorney sent letters to counsel for Appellants before the 1998 Board of 
Adjustment hearing explaining that they bore the burden of demonstrating that they were 
entitled to the nonconforming use, and needed to submit evidence that they were entitled 
to the nonconforming use with respect to each parcel of Letter of November 4,1998 from 
Steven C. Osborn to Franklin L. Slaugh. Tab no. 5; R. at213.; see also Letter of 
September 29, 1998 from Steven C. Osborn to Franklin L. Slaugh. Tab no. 4; R. at 212. 
75
 Brief of Appellants at 15. 
76
 The Notice and Order only refers to the homes at Alia Panna Way and 9400 South. It 
was sent to John Collins at his address at Maison Drive, but that home was not the subject 
of the Notice and Order. Appellants admit that the Maison Drive home was not covered 
by the Cease and Desist Order, but claim that because it was the subject of the (1996) 
Board of Adjustment hearing along with the other homes, the Board's ruling was intended 
to apply to it as well. Brief of Appellants at 14. The 1996 Board ruling was on the issue 
of whether the City's ordinances as written prohibited short-term rentals; it was not a 
nonconforming use hearing. Even if it had been, Appellant has pointed to no specific 
evidence adduced at that hearing about actual use of the Maison Drive property as a ski 
rental. 
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sent, but was not the subject of the Order.77 Appellants have not identified any evidence in 
the record showing that the Maison Drive property was used for short-term rentals at any 
time. On the contrary, the Minutes for the Board of Adjustment hearing on November 12, 
1998, state as follows: "Paul Harris, 9225 South Maison, lives next to another of the 
subject houses owned by Mr. Collins. He has lived in his home continuously since Mr. 
Collins owned the property. To his knowledge, the renters in the house had longer leases, 
possibly nine months to a year."78 This testimony was not rebutted. 
The cease and desist order only stated that the zoning officer had determined that the 
owners were operating a business, a transitory lodging facility, without a license and in 
violation of the City's business license ordinance and the land development code:79 it said 
nothing about the historical inception date, nature, or scope of any such uses. The rule in 
most jurisdictions in the United States is that substantial operations are needed to establish a 
nonconforming use; not only must there have been some actual nonconforming operations, 
but these must have been substantial in quantity.80 Because the Property Owners . failed to 
The Appellants apparently lived at the Maison Drive home when the 1996 Cease and 
Desist Order was issued, inasmuch as that is where the document was sent. Appellants 
then sought a Board of Adjustment ruling on the Maison Drive parcel along with the 
other three homes on the legality of short-term rentals, perhaps hoping they might begin 
renting that home as a ski rental along with the three others they owned. 
78
 Nov. 12,1998 Bd. of Adj. Minutes at 6, Tab 7. 
79
 Notice and Order to John Collins from Nolan Isom, March 26,1996, Tab 1, R. at 155. 
80
 N. Williams, 4A American Land Planning Law §110.03. Township ofFruitport v. 
Baxter, 6 Mich App 283, 148 NW2d 888 (1967)(moving several truckloads of used auto 
parts onto premises for storage prior to the ordinance passage was not sufficient), 
O 'Rourke v. Teeters, 63 Cal App 2d 349,146 P.2d 983 (1944) (display room for electrical 
fixtures and office in residence was not sufficient to establish a nonconforming use), 
Paruszewski v. Township ofElsinboro, 297 NJ Super 5341, 688 A2d 662 (1997)( 
sporadic aviation activities on farm not enough to establish a nonconforming use for 
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provide any evidence at either hearing of inception date, length, or nature of the of uses at 
either hearing, the Board of Adjustment correctly determined that the Notice and Order was 
insufficient of itself to establish the existence of a lawful prior nonconforming use. The 
cases cited by the Appellants on the point that some courts have allowed the establishment 
of a nonconforming use where the use was intermittent or seasonal,81 provide no support 
because the record contains no evidence about such use. 
The Collinses complain that since at the 1996 Board of Adjustment hearing the 
short-term rental use of the properties was admitted by the Collins, and because the City 
had told them to stop such uses of the homes, they should not now be denied their 
nonconforming use just because they did not put on evidence of such use when they had 
stopped using the properties as short-term rentals because of the City's Order.82 But the 
purposes of the two hearings was entirely different as the Collinses knew: the first hearing 
was about the interpretation of an ordinance; the second should have focused on the 
Owners presenting evidence of the historical inception date, length, and nature of the short-
term use, as they were reminded before the hearing. If the Collins were claiming, as they 
apparently intended, that their use prior to the Cease and Desist Order was sufficient to 
airport), Pearce v. Lorson, 393 SW2d 851 (Mo App 1965) (nonconforming use as medical 
office not established by treating one patient, putting sign in window, and moving in a 
chair), Town ofWallingford v. Roberts, 145 Conn 682,146 A2d 588 (1958) (purchase of 
land for trailer park just before zoning regulation change, with five trailers placed on 
property, insufficient for nonconforming use). 
81
 Andrew v. King County 586 P.2d 509 (1978 Wash App), King County v. High, 219 
P.2d 118 (Wash 1950); Warner v. Clackamas County, 111 Ore. App. 11; 824 P.2d 423; 
(1992 Ore. App.); Polk County v. Martin 292 Ore. 69; 636 P.2d 952; Peacock Township 
v. Panetta, 81 Mich. App. 733; 265 N.W.2d 810 (1978 Mich. App.) 
82
 See Brief of Appellants at 14, 15. 
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establish a nonconforming use, then they should at least have presented evidence about the 
use before that time. They didn't. The Appellants had the burden of proof on this point, as 
they were told. They chose instead to rely solely on the existence of the Cease and Desist 
Order and the Brown decision. The Board of Adjustment properly determined that the 
nonconforming use had not been demonstrated, and denied the application. 
B. The 1996 Cease and Desist Order Doesn 't Prove 
There Would Have Been a Nonconforming Use in 1998 
The Owners make an illogical jump to assert that a zoning officer finding a violation 
in 1996 proves that the owners would have been renting the properties when the new 
ordinance became effective two years later. 
The Owners introduced no evidence that they would have been renting the 
properties in 1998. Specifically, they did not establish (1) the extent of short-term use for 
each home before the 1996 Cease and Desist Order, such as the dates, frequency and 
duration of rentals, and the seasons of the year during which the rentals occurred; (2) that 
the Owners' desired or intended to rent each parcel short-term on to the date of the new 
ordinance by such evidence as seeking a stay of enforcement from the Board of 
Adjustment83 or district court,84 appealing the district court decision against them, 
expenditures on improvements and maintenance on the property, leases, etc. 
§10-9-708((7)(b)(ii), U.C.A (1999), §15-5-10(H), Rev. Ord. of Sandy City 
§10-9-708((7)(b)(iii), U.C.A (1999). 
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CONCLUSION 
The Owners elected not to appeal the adverse decisions of the earlier Board of 
Adjustment and the trial court, and relitigation is now precluded. Even if issue preclusion 
did not apply here. The Owners failed to carry their burden to show, by evidence, that they 
were entitled to a nonconforming use before the Board of Adjustment. Because of the lack 
of evidence, they cannot show that the trial court erred in its decision. The City and the 
Board of Adjustment therefore request that the court affirm the decision of the trial court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED th i sZH day of July, 2000. 
Osborn 
Attorney for Appellees 
25 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a true copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellees to be 
deposited in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, or to be hand delivered, addressed to Franklin 
L. Slaugh, Attorney at Law, 880 East 9400 South, Suite 103, Sandy Utah 84094, this 28th 
day of July, 2000. 
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ADDENDUM 
Tab 1 Notice and Order to Cease and Desist, March 26, 1996 
Tab 2 Minutes of the Sandy City Board of Adjustment, Aug. 8, 1996 
Tab 3 Freeman on Judgments, §713 
Tab 4 September 29,1998 letter to Franklin L. Slaugh from Steven C. Osborn 
Tab 5 November 4,1998 letter to Franklin L. Slaugh from Steven C. Osbom 
Tab 6 Sandy City Development Code, Chapter 15-24, Nonconforming Uses 
Tab 7 Minutes of the November 12, 1998 Board of Adjustment hearing on John 
and June Collins Nonconforming Use Request 
Tabl 
March 26, 1996 Date served: ~? -%>&-'?(+ 
Time: /J'/JD 
John F. Collins 
9255 South Maison Drive 
Sandy, Utah 84093-2427 
REF: Conducting Business Without A License 
LOCATION: 1875 East Alia Panna Way Sidwell No,2$-04-478-004 
1456 East Longdate Drive Sidwell No.28-21-107-001 
472 East 9400 South Sidwell No,28-07*202-006 
NOTICE AND ORDER TO CEASE AND DESIST 
Dear Mr. Collins: 
I have detemiined that you are operating a business, a transitory Jodging facility at the above 
referenced location. This letter is to notify you that doing so is a violation of the Sandy City 
Business License ordinance Section 5-1-1 and the Land Development Code, chapter 15-7. Each 
day of operation may be a separate violation. 
You will need to immediately correct the violation by ceasing all operations within twenty four 
(24) hours of receipt of this notice. A copy of this Notice and Order will be forwarded to the 
City Attorneys office. 
If you do not comply by the above time limit, the City will take ftirther enforcement action 
against you. 
If you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact the Business Licensing Department 
at 568-7252 or Code Enforcement at 568-6054 and 568-7258, 
THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE THAT YOU WILL RECEIVE. 
Sincerely, 
/ Nolen Isom 
Code Enforcement Officer 
10000 CENTENNIAL PARKWAY • SANDY, UTAH 84070 • PHONE (801) 568-7100 VOICE/TDD 
•Q^-cr , C C C T ppr . u d H T f ; q R T , c T R f , . T ) N y ^ q N I 1 1 0 3 NHQI : WCfeLI 
Tab 2 
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7. John Collins Alleged Error Request 
9255 South Maison Drive 
1875 East Alia Panna Way 
472 East 9400 South 
1456 East Longdate Drive BOA #96-31 
John Collins, who owns or controls property located at 9255 South Maison Drive, 1875 East Alia 
Panna Way, 472 East 9400 South and 1456 East Longdale Drive, which are all located in R-l zones, 
has filed a request that the Board of Adjustment determine that City staff erred in their decision that 
Mr. Collins' practice of using the homes as places of public accommodation, renting his houses to 
short-term guests (nightly and weekly), is not allowed in R-l zones in Sandy City. Mr. Collins is 
being represented by Franklin Slaugh, an attorney, who has set forth the basis for their appeal in a 
letter dated June 27, 1996, which is included in the Board packet. 
Chairman Larry Bowler delegated chairman responsibility for this item to Alan Walsh, who has 
more experience in legal issues. 
Brok Armantrout stated that City staff has determined that using structures built as single family 
homes as places of public accommodation (i.e., nightly or weekly rentals) is not a use allowed within 
R-l zones. According to the Sandy City Development Code and the Utah Code Annotated, it is 
required that the applicant bear the burden of proof that Sandy City has made an error in their 
determination. The basis for staffs determination is as follows: 1) the intent of R-l zones is to 
provide a residential environment within Sandy City that has a minimum of vehicular traffic and 
creates a quiet, residential neighborhood favorable to family life; 2) in order to accomplish this 
purpose, the City Council has designated specific uses which are allowed in residential zones-short-
term rentals are not listed as a permitted use in these zones; the City has provided other types of land 
uses which permit short-term stays in the City (i.e., hotel/motel/ bed and breakfast); 3) provisions 
and requirements contained in the Development Code are the minimum requirements for each zone 
which specifically indicate that property may not be used for any other purpose other than that 
specifically listed as allowed in the Code; 4) short-term rentals are different than a use-as a single-
family dwelling as indicated in a variety of statutes and ordinances of both Sandy City and the State 
of Utah, which state that such use is not considered to be single family dwelling, but rather a place 
of public accommodation requiring different building standards, life and safety standards, tax 
implications and business license requirements; 5) it is Sandy City's experience that neighborhoods 
are affected significantly differently by the use of these structures as short-term rentals as opposed 
to a single family dwelling (i.e., late night, loud partying on a continual basis; numerous vehicles 
entering and leaving the neighborhoods; little or no responsibility or accountability by the occupants 
of the rental units; strangers which are constantly changing; no ability to develop a community 
relationship with occupants). 
Mr. Slaugh. the attorney representing Mr. Collins, stated that his client is not suggesting that the City 
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cannot regulate short-term rentals and this type of land use in residential zones; clearly that falls 
within the police power of the City. Mr Slaugh stated that the intent of his letter to Sandy City was 
to outline concerns he has with the status of the current regulations. The City is suggesting that 
short-term rentals fall within the other types of commercial uses—hotel/motel, bed and breakfast 
facility, or business use—but it seems clear that the type of use being discussed doesn't really fit 
neatly within any of the definitions. This is not a business use because the occupant doesn't conduct 
an accessory use. There is no specificity in the current ordinances that give a landlord any real 
guidance as to what he or she can or cannot do to avoid violating the law. Any time you have this 
situation, constitutional issues are raised and there is a concern of vagueness and constitutional 
rights. There is no definition of "short-term rental"—is it less than thirty days?,he asked. Is it one 
week? Is it overnight? He stated since the definition is not specific and in writing, a person does 
not know when they are crossing the line and violating the code. Mr. Collins' wish is to know where 
he stands. The law should be specific enough so that a person could read an ordinance and know 
what is prohibited and what is allowed. Frank Slaugh said he was unable to respond to the request 
for more information from his client requested by the Board of Adjustment because he did not think 
it was needed, and because the law is not clear. He said his client has not heard of specific 
complaints about misconduct regarding his properties. The Appellant wants to know where he 
stands. Mr. Slaugh did allow that he didn't think a constitutional taking argument came into play 
here. The City is saying to my client, "We know what you were told, but it is no longer legal." 
Alan Walsh read the definition of "dwelling, single family" from Section 15-2-2 of the Sandy 
Development Code, as follows: 
Dwelling. Single Family. A detached housing unit within a structure with kitchen and 
sleeping facilities, designed for occupancy by one family . . . . 
Alan Walsh then asked if the homes of Mr. Collins which are in dispute fall under that definition. 
Mr. Slaugh stated that, yes, he thought they did at any given time the people were renting the 
property. Mr. Slaugh said he was not going to suggest that everyone he rents to during the ski or 
golf season meets that strict definition. "How do you define a family?," asked Mr. Slaugh. 
Allan Walsh said a family a was defined in the Sand City Development Code as "An individual or 
two or more persons related by blood, marriage or adoption, or a group not to exceed four 
unrelated persons living together as a single housekeeping unit." [Section 15-2-2, Rev. Ord. 
Sandy City.] He then asked Frank Slaugh if he thought his client's clientele fit that definition. 
Frank Slaugh responded that for the week, two weeks, three weeks, or a month that they occupy the 
properties, he felt they did meet the definition. In many cases they are families, but in some cases 
they are unrelated. 
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Allan Walsh then asked if Collins rented to four more people who were unrelated. 
John Collins. 1456 Longdale Drive, and owner of the rental homes, stated that he generally rents 
to a couple or a person who may ask to have guests while they are renting the home. He added that 
he does not control the guests that the renters invite to stay with them, whether by the year or by the 
week. He knows, however, how many guests may be staying int he home; they may have five to 
eight people staying there during any one rental. He said that they are often related, but not all the 
time. He added that it is difficult to check on their relationship. Alan Walsh asked Mr. Collins what 
he did during the off-ski season with his rentals. Mr. Collins replied that sometimes he rented them 
on either a short- or long-term basis, or sometimes they were vacant. Mike Corrigan asked Mr. 
Collins if he ever checked on his rental properties while they were being rented. Mr. Collins stated 
that he drove by the homes nightly during the ski season. Mr. Collins said he didn't rent to more 
than twenty people. He also said he had never seen a bus at the homes. 
Dave Evans asked "What does it mean to keep house?" Dave Evans stated that he felt short-term 
renters did not meet the definition of "housekeeping". 
Frank Slaugh said that he kept house, and that it meant to clean the house, do the dishes, vacuum, 
shovel the snow. Mr. Slaugh then asked what "keeping a sense of community" meant. He said 
his concern about his neighbors is not keeping house. As to shoveling snow, John Collins said if 
the renters want to shovel snow, they can. He said his ski renters do shovel the snow. Frank 
Slaugh said his client had received no specific complaints about the properties. Mr. Slaugh 
reiterated that he is not stating that the City cannot regulate rentals, but that they have not done it 
since they do not have a specific ordinance relating to short- and long-term rentals. Dave Evans 
asked if the term "short-term rental" needed to be defined in the Code in order to be clear. Mr. 
Slaugh stated that yes, he felt it needed to be more clearly defined. Alan Walsh asked Mr. Collins 
if he put limitations on the number of guests that were allowed in the houses he rented. Mr. Collins 
replied that he did, but it varied, depending on the size of the house. There is also a limitation on 
how many cars are allowed. This information is spelled out in the rental agreements. Mr. Evans said 
that he didn't feel the term "short-term rental" needed to be defined because the definitions in the 
City Code were already addressed adequately in the Code. 
Frank Slaugh said that Brok Armantrout told Collins he could rent to short-term tenants. John 
Collins said he saw fifty ski rentals before 1985, and so he said he wanted to do it too, since the City 
was not doing anything about it. Salt Lake County said it was OK. Others told him Sandy allowed 
it. He said someone called Brok Armantrout in 1995 about his rights, and that a person named 
Michelle Hunt in March at Sandy told Mr. Collins that Sandy was not going after all ski rentals - just 
the ones that were causing trouble. John Collins said he began doing ski rentals in 1994 - when he 
called. Everyone is giving out different information at the City, said Mr. Collins, which confused 
people. He said he owned two properties before he started this type of business in 1994; and he 
bought the other two since 1990. Dave Evans then asked if all four of the properties were therefore 
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purchased before he started doing nightly ski rentals. John Collins said no; he just bought two. 
Frank Slaugh said that he never said Collins bought the properties based on the representations of 
the Sandy City employees. But he did start conducting his business of short-term rentals based on 
the statements of City employees. Frank Slaugh said that because his client would make less on 
long-term rentals than he could by ski rentals, he would suffer detriment if he was prevented from 
doing short-term rentals, because the short-term rentals were much more profitable than long-term 
rentals. 
Dave Evans then asked what detriment Collins suffered if he relied on bad advice. If your client 
made extra money because he rented his properties as short-term ski rentals based on bad advice, 
how was that to his detriment, if he was allowed to keep the extra money he made, he asked. Once 
he returns to monthly rentals, he is right back to the status quo - right back to where he was anyway, 
said Mr. Evans. You are trying to present that this man has been damaged, but I don't see the 
damage, said Mr. Evans. 
Frank Slaugh responded that he supposed there would be no detriment during that period of time; 
He said his client shouldn't have to guess if he was in violation of the Code. 
In response to a question about the role of the Board from Larry Bowler, Steve Osborn said the 
decision of the Board was to decide if there was a rational basis for the decision of the zoning 
administrator; whether the zoning administrator had made an error. 
John Collins said he bought one of his properties after he got the representations by Brok. Mr. 
Collins added that he realized that too many people in a house posed problems. He said that he 
allows the properties to be rented out to the following numbers of individuals: 
9255 South Maison Drive - six people 
1875 East Alia Panna Way - twelve people 
472 East 9400 South - twelve people 
1456 East Longdale Drive - eight people 
He said he limits the number of cars in the lease to two to three cars per house. Frank Slaugh 
suggested that his clients' rights might be "grandfathered." When asked about the numbers of 
people in each rental unit right now, John Collins said he didn't think he needed to respond to that. 
Mr. Slaugh then asked to be excused in order to attend to a family medical emergency, which was 
permitted by the Chairman. 
Lowell Brown. 9273 Creponette Drive, spokesman for residents of Montana Rancho Estates, referred 
to the statement Mr. Collins made about not receiving any complaints. He disagreed with this 
statement, saying there have been many incidents, one in particular involving a hit and run accident 
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at one of the houses by a renter. The residents feel their property values will decrease if this type 
of rental is allowed to continue. They are concerned about the increase of vehicular traffic and 
maintenance of the rental properties, and the shoveling of snow at them. 
Nancy Nielson. 1946 Alia Pana Way, Montana Ranchos subdivision, read a letter from the residents 
in support of the City's interpretation of short-term rentals urging the Board to reject the application. 
She also noted that most apartments or rental homes require a minimum six-month lease agreement. 
She added that the Collins were violating the restrictive covenants and zoning of the Montana 
Ranchos subdivisions, citing specific provisions which stated that "no lot shall be used except for 
residential purposes"; and further states "no building shall be used except for a single family 
dwelling." She said that use of the homes as a motel, as Mr. Collins had done, was not consistent 
with these definitions. She said that John Collins was well aware of these covenants, because had 
spearheaded a lawsuit based on these same covenants in opposing constructing an LDS chapel in the 
subdivision. Mr. Collins also signed a petition opposing a day care center in one of the homes of 
the subdivision based on the restrictive covenants. Alan Walsh told her that the Board of 
Adjustment does not involve itself in the enforcement of private covenants and restrictions, 
although the Board is sensitive to the issue. 
Joe Galow. 9302 S. Tortellini Drive, resident of Montana Ranchos subdivision, stated that he agreed 
with the previous two resident speakers. He said that transients do not have any interest in the 
neighborhood—the property is not taken care of. Transients are not a positive influence on the 
environment He said he did not want meth' lab explosions in his neighborhood. He added that they 
have had some traffic problems [with renters] and some "hot dogs". 
Gardner Buchanan. 1749 E. Sunrise Meadow, lives one block west of the rental property located in 
the Montana Ranchos subdivision. They have a rental home four houses down from them which is 
owned by Joseph Bowers, not by Mr. Collins, but is used for the same purpose as those owned by 
Mr. Collins. Mr. Walsh stated that since the issues Mr. Buchanan would be addressing were not 
regarding a home owned by Mr. Collins, they wouldn't be relevant to this discussion. Mr. Buchanan 
stated that he was aware of that fact, but felt the problems he had personally witnessed would be the 
same in any of the ski rental homes. He stated that the home was in an R-l zone, being used as a 
commercial enterprise, which is not appropriate for the area. He has personally witnessed instances 
of nudity involving hot tubs, lack of snow removal, and problems in the summertime with lack of 
proper care of the yard, which has caused weeds to fly into the Buchanan's yard. 
Ronald Robbins. 472 East 9400 South, lives adjacent to Mr. Collins' rental property on 9400 South, 
which the John Collins purchased about a year and a half ago. He stated that the group of neighbors 
in that area whom he was representing felt that City staff did not err in their decision [in ruling that 
rentals of less than 30 days were prohibited]. They have had problems with noise this past winter 
on almost every weekend. Just last weekend there were noise problems again from the house. The 
current renters are Spanish-American cement workers employed to work on the Salt Palace. 
^\ - * ^ i 
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Lvle OdendahL 1769 Sunrise Park Circle, did not have specific complaints about one of the 
properties, but wanted to make some comments. He felt that anyone who has this type of ski rental 
home should be thankful that the City and the State Tax Commission have not brought criminal 
proceedings against them for their failure to meet life safety codes and to pay taxes for their short-
term rentals. He believes that failure to meet life-safety codes should be prosecuted criminally. He 
stated that many other people have been notified of violations and have had to come into compliance 
even if they were not aware of the violation, and that Mr. Collins should have to do the same. You 
do not need to be a rocket scientist to determine what the law says, he pointed out; Collins was on 
constructive notice of the law. 
Bill Evans. 1451 E. Longdale Drive, lives directly across the street from Mr. Collins. He stated that 
the Collins family moved out of the house during the ski season, so they did not know whom to 
contact with any problems. He stated that the property, both driveway and sidewalks, went for four 
weeks without snow removal last winter. He said he did not know who to contact about the 
problem [of snow removal on the sidewalks.] Mike Corrigan asked if there were any other 
problems at the property. There were two to three out-of-state cars at the house most of the time, 
which changed frequently, and eight renters were allowed to live there. It is one thing to live in a 
neighborhood where the renters change every month or so; but it is another to have people living in 
a house in the neighborhood who change four times as often as that, or who change even more 
frequently than that. We have invested in this neighborhood. He said that he had not developed 
any meaningful relationships with any renters. He said he liked the Collins as neighbors, but 
disliked the short rental use. People know intuitively that this use is incompatible with the 
neighborhood. He gave staff a petition signed by forty-two residents in the area who are all opposed 
to the use of the home as a short-term rental. 
David Gillette. 1130 Lexington Circle, lives near the Collins rental property on Longdale and stated 
that he has the same concerns that have already been stated. He said that in gathering the petition 
signatures in his neighborhood, not one resident opposed the City position (prohibiting rentals of 
less than 30 days). His other concern is that the entire neighborhood could become short-term 
rentals since there are several other rental homes in the area. He noted that there were lots of 
children in the neighborhood. Allowing short-term rentals will increase traffic, and the likelihood 
of an auto accident involving those children. He stated that the City code adequately defines the 
purpose and definition of a residential neighborhood other than possibly a better definition of "short-
term rental". He stated that in a hotel/motel, which would be more appropriate for this type of rental, 
there are employees on the site to handle any problems with the abusive guests—there is no one on 
site at these rental homes to handle this type of situation. Therefore, the neighbors are the ones who 
have to police the area. We did not move here to become the local police, he added. 
Sylvia Brunisholz. 9383 S. Maison, lives four houses from the rental home on Alia Pana and stated 
that her main concern is for the children in the area. She stated there are twelve to fourteen boys, 
ranging in age from fourteen to eighteen, who are currently living in the basement of the rental 
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home. (Mr. Collins replied from the audience: "not that he knew of"). She said that just last 
Saturday she saw a number of teenagers on the lawn of the house by a van, and that a neighbor said 
she saw more than 14 teenagers there. She stated that the least amount of cars she has seen parked 
at the house has been three and as many as nine. She is concerned that the situation seems rather 
"mysterious"—drapes are always drawn and she doesn't see the boys except in the morning when 
she goes to work. She said one of the teenagers said it was a group home; that all were dropouts 
with no adult living there. Today she said she saw two women there with two babies and two little 
kids and other children in the front yard of the home. She expressed concern about the three-year 
old boy who runs around the neighborhood. She said that she knew her neighbors, but this gives her 
twelve additional kids in the neighborhood that she doesn't know that she has to worry about as 
a parent. 
Jerry Morgan. 9266 Maison Drive, who spoke about one of Collins' homes directly across the street. 
He stated that a couple of years ago there was a group of girls and boys in their twenties living at 
the Collins' house across the street who would have as many as five to seven cars at the house. They 
were a rowdy partying group. One of the girls living at the house at the time rammed my car with 
hers; we tracked her down to Park City. We could not trust the situation, he said. We had to contact 
the mother of the girl to get our car repaired. We don't need groups of young kids renting houses 
in a family neighborhood. I don't mind families renting on a long-term lease. 
Mr. Gillette stated that Mr. Collins has led the Board to believe that he knows what is going on in 
his rental houses, but feels that is not the case. 
Steve Osborne asked for more information on the "partying" that Mr. Robbins had mentioned. 
Mr. Robbins stated that it was loud music with lots of bass which would vibrate the windows even 
at 12:00 midnight and later. The music was generally on weekend evenings and would run through 
midnight. Mr. Robbins did not try to contact anyone because he didn't know who owned the home. 
He could not address the traffic because the house in question faces 9400 South. Mr. Robbins stated 
that he didn't know if there were any drugs involved, but there were plenty of beer cans. 
Annette Hathenbruclc 1421 Longdate Drive, who lives two houses from the Collins property at 1421 
Longdate Drive, stated that many of her neighbors did not receive notice of and did not know about 
the meeting. She stated that Mr. Collins is living in the house now, but if he moves out, they are 
worried it will be another rental. She also said that earlier this year two cars raced up the street and 
then pulled into the driveway of the rental house owned by Collins . 
Mr. Collins, owner of the rentals, stated that he did not know about the racing cars. He said the car 
accident with Karen Morgan which was mentioned, happened with a long-term renter and that he 
was not notified about it —he found out from a neighbor. He said he did not know his 
responsibilities as a landlord, but said he would have gladly helped. He said he did remove the 
people who caused the accident. Alan Walsh asked Mr. Collins what the average length of stay 
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would be for renters during the ski season. Mr. Collins replied that it was usually one to two weeks. 
He said he takes deposits from the renters of less than 30 days, and can evict them more rapidly. 
In response to the testimony that there had been nine cars at Alia Pana Drive, he asked if a renter had 
fewer rights than residents. 
Mr Collins stated that he would appreciate it if the neighbors would contact him if they have any 
problems with renters, both short and long term. When he first got into the rental business, he came 
to Sandy City because he knew other people who were renting and he thought it was OK with Sandy 
City. He said the City employees read the Code to him. Mr. Collins said he asked them to define 
the term "family." He said no one told him about the issue of four unrelated people. He said part 
of the Code was read to him Mike Corrigan asked Mr. Collins if he asked for a copy of the Code 
when he contacted Sandy City. Mr. Collins stated that he did not get a copy-he just talked to the 
City about it. He feels Sandy City needs to be more specific, in writing, how long a person can rent. 
Mr. Collins asked what the minimum age for a tenant renting a property could be. Bill Roskelley 
asked Mr. Collins if he had a clause in his contracts addressing drugs. Mr. Collins replied that he 
did not address drugs specifically, just that the renter must adhere to local laws. Dave Evans asked 
Mr. Collins about the home which was mentioned that had several young boys living in it. Mr. 
Collins replied that he thought there were eight related young men who are married—they are a 
family of builders who have moved here for the summer. He also stated that he did not know if they 
had other people living there and that he would look into it. Steve Osborne asked Mr. Collins when 
he purchased each of the four homes in questions. Mr. Collins replied that the home on Maison was 
approximately 1981; Alia Pana, 1990; 9400 South, 1995; and Longdale 1994 or 1995. He has had 
them as rentals for a number of years. When asked when he started renting out each of the properties 
as short-term (less than 30-day) rentals, Collins replied that he could not say. Steve Osborn 
reminded him that the City had asked for that information earlier from him, to which Collins 
responded that they should see his attorney. 
Dave Evans commented that he felt the intent of the City ordinance relative to residential zones was 
defined as someone who lives there for housekeeping purposes—becoming part of a neighborhood 
watch, knowing their neighbors, looking out for and being concerned about each other—and doesn't 
see how nightly or short-term rentals meets this definition. The staff has interpreted the ordinance 
to fall within the general intent of a neighborhood and the concern is disregard of accountability. 
Bill Roskelley commented that rentals of apartments or homes usually require a six-month to one 
year lease and that shorter rentals, such as nightly or weekly, were best handled at hotels or motels. 
He feels staff made the right decision. 
John Collins, who owns or controls property located at 9255 South Maison Drive, 1875 East Alia 
Panna Way, 472 East 9400 South and 1456 East Longdale Drive, which are all located in R-l zones, 
has filed a request that the Board of Adjustment determine that City staff erred in their decision that 
Mr. Collins' practice of using the homes as places of public accommodation, renting his houses to 
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short-term guests (nightly and weekly), is not allowed in R-l zones in Sandy City. Mr. Collins is 
being represented by Franklin Slaugh, an attorney, who has set forth the basis for their appeal in a 
letter dated June 27, 1996, which is included in the Board packet. 
Chairman Larry Bowler delegated chairman responsibility for this item to Alan Walsh, who has 
more experience in legal issues. 
Brok Armantrout stated that City staff has determined that using structures built as single family 
homes as places of public accommodation (i.e., nightly or weekly rentals) is not a use allowed within 
R-l zones. According to the Sandy City Development Code and the Utah Code Annotated, it is 
required that the applicant bear the burden of proof that Sandy City has made an error in their 
determination. The basis for staffs determination is as follows: 1) the intent of R-l zones is to 
provide a residential environment within Sandy City that has a minimum of vehicular traffic and 
creates a quiet, residential neighborhood favorable to family life; 2) in order to accomplish this 
purpose, the City Council has designated specific uses which are allowed in residential zones-short-
term rentals are not listed as a permitted use in these zones; the City has provided other types of land 
uses which permit short-term stays in the City (i.e., hotel/motel/ bed and breakfast); 3) provisions 
and requirements contained in the Development Code are the minimum requirements for each zone 
which specifically indicate that property may not be used for any other purpose other than that 
specifically listed as allowed in the Code; 4) short-term rentals are different than a use as a single-
family dwelling as indicated in a variety of statutes and ordinances of both Sandy City and the State 
of Utah, which state that such use is not considered to be single family dwelling, but rather a place 
of public accommodation requiring different building standards, life and safety standards, tax 
implications and business license requirements; 5) it is Sandy City's experience that neighborhoods 
are affected significantly differently by the use of these structures as short-term rentals as opposed 
to a single family dwelling (i.e., late night, loud partying on a continual basis; numerous vehicles 
entering and leaving the neighborhoods; little or no responsibility or accountability by the occupants 
of the rental units; strangers which are constantly changing; no ability to develop a community 
relationship with occupants). 
Mr. Slaugh, attorney representing Mr. Collins, stated that his client is not suggesting that the City 
cannot regulate short-term rentals and the type of land use in residential zones. The intent of his 
letter to Sandy City was to highlight concerns he has with the status of the current regulations. The 
City is suggesting that short-term rentals fall within the other types of commercial uses—hotel/motel, 
bed and breakfast facility, or business use—but it seems clear that the type of use being discussed 
doesn't really fit neatly within any of the definitions. There is no specificity in the current 
ordinances that give a landlord any real guidance as to what he or she can or cannot do to avoid 
violating the law. Any time you have this situation, constitutional issues are raised and there is a 
concern of vagueness and constitutional rights. There is no definition of "short-term rental"-is it 
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less than sixty days? Is it one week? Is it overnight? He stated since the definition is not specific 
and in writing, a person does not know when they are crossing the line and violating the code. Mr. 
Collins' wish is to know where he stands. The law should be specific enough so that a person could 
read an ordinance and know what they can or cannot do. 
Alan Walsh read the definition of "dwelling, single family" and asked if the homes Mr. Collins is 
renting fall under that definition. Mr. Slaugh stated that, yes, he thought they did for the time the 
people were renting the property. 
John Collins, 1456 Longdate Drive and owner of the rental homes, stated that he generally rents to 
a couple or a person who may have guests while they are renting the home. Alan Walsh asked Mr. 
Collins what he did during the off-ski season with his rentals. Mr. Collins replied that sometimes 
he rented them on either a short- or long-term basis, or sometimes they were vacant. Mike Corrigan 
asked Mr. Collins if he ever checked on his rental properties while they were being rented. Mr. 
Collins stated that he drove by nightly during the ski season. Dave Evans stated that he felt short-
term renters did not meet the definition of "housekeeping". Mr. Slaugh reiterated that he is not 
stating that the City cannot regulate rentals, but that they have not done it since they do not have a 
specific ordinance relating to short- and long-term rentals. Dave Evans asked if the term "short-term 
rental" needed to be defined in the Code in order to clear. Mr. Slaugh stated that yes, he felt it 
needed to be more clearly defined. Alan Walsh asked Mr. Collins if he put limitations on the 
number of guests that were allowed in the houses he rented. Mr. Collins replied that he did, but it 
varied, depending on the size of the house. There is also a limitation on how many cars are allowed. 
This information is spelled out in the rental agreements. 
Lowell Brown, 9273 Creponette Drive, spokesman for residents of Montana Rancho Estates, referred 
to the statement Mr. Collins made about not receiving any complaints. He disagreed with this 
statement, saying there have been many incidents, one in particular involving a hit and run accident 
at one of the houses involving a renter. The residents feel their property value will decrease if this 
type of rental is allowed to continue. They are concerned about the increase of vehicular traffic and 
maintenance of the homes. 
Nancy Nielson, 1946 Alia Pana Way, Montana Ranchos subdivision, read a letter from the residents 
in support of the City's interpretation of short-term rentals. She also noted that most apartments or 
rental homes require a minimum six-month lease agreement. 
Joe Galow, 9302 S. Tortellini Drive, resident of Montana Ranchos subdivision, stated that transients 
do not have an interest in the neighborhood-the property is not taken care of. 
Gardner Buchanan, 1749 E. Sunrise Meadow, lives one block west of the rental property located in 
the Montana Ranchos subdivision. They have a rental home four houses down from them which is 
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not owned by Mr. Collins, but is used for the same purpose as those owned by Mr. Collins. Mr. 
Walsh stated that since the issues Mr. Buchanan would be addressing were not regarding a home 
owned by Mr. Collins, they wouldn't be relevant to this discussion. Mr. Buchanan stated that he was 
aware of that fact, but felt the problems he had personally witnessed would be the same in any of the 
ski rental homes. He stated that the home was in an R-l zone, being used as a commercial 
enterprise, which is not appropriate for the area. He has personally witnessed problems with nudity, 
lack of snow removal, and problems in the summertime with lack of proper care of the yard. 
Ronald Robbins, 472 East 9400 South, lives adjacent to Mr. Collins' rental property on 9400 South, 
stated that the group he was representing felt that City staff did not err in their decision. They have 
had problems with noise this past winter on almost every weekend. They have had no problems with 
the current renters. 
Lyle Odenthal, 1769 Sunrise Park Circle, did not have specific complaints about one of the 
properties, but wanted to make some comments. He felt that anyone who has this type of ski rental 
home should be thankful that the City and the State Tax Commission have not brought criminal 
proceedings against them for their failure to meet life safety codes and to pay taxes for their short-
term rentals. He stated that many other people have been notified of violations and have had to come 
into compliance even if they were not aware of the violation, and that Mr. Collins should have to do 
the same. 
Bill Evans, 1451 E. Longdale Drive, lives directly across the street from Mr. Collins. He stated that 
the Collins family moved out of the house during the ski season, so they did not know who to 
contact with any problems. He stated that the property, both driveway and sidewalks, went for many 
weeks without snow removal. Mike Corrigan asked if there were any other problems at the property. 
Mr. Evans stated that he hadn't really had any problems, but there were two to three out-of-state cars 
most of the time. He gave staff a petition signed by forty-two residents in the area who are all 
opposed to the use of the home as a short-term rental. 
David Gillette, 1130 Lexington Circle, lives near the rental on Longdale and stated that he has the 
same concerns that have already been stated. His other concern is that the entire neighborhood could 
become short-term rentals since there are several other rental homes in the area. He stated that the 
City code adequately defines the purpose and definition of a residential neighborhood other than 
possibly a better definition of "short-term rental". He stated that in a hotel/motel, which would be 
more appropriate for this type of rental, there are employees on the site to handle any problems with 
the abusive guests—there is no one on site at these rental homes to handle this type of situation. 
Therefore, the neighbors are the ones who have to police the area. 
Sylvia Brunisholz, 9383 S. Maison, lives four houses from the rental home on Alia Pana and stated 
that her main concern is for the children in the area. She stated there are twelve to fourteen boys, 
ranging in age from fourteen to eighteen, who are currently living in the basement of the rental 
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home. (Mr. Collins replied from the audience: "not that he knew of) . She'stated that the least 
amount of cars she has seen parked at the house has been three and as many as nine. She is 
concerned that the situation seems rather "mysterious"—drapes are always drawn and the boys are 
never seen except in the morning. 
Jerry Morgan, 9266 Maison Drive, stated that a couple of years ago there was a group of kids in their 
twenties living at the house who would have as many as five to seven cars at the house. They were 
a rowdy group, and there was a car accident involving one of the girls living at the house at the time. 
Mr. Gillette stated that Mr. Collins has led the Board to believe that he knows what is going on in 
his rental houses, but feels that is not the case. 
Steve Osborne asked for more information on the "partying" that Mr. Robbins had mentioned. Mr. 
Robbins stated that it was loud music with lots of bass which would vibrate the windows. The music 
was generally on weekend evenings and would run through midnight. Mr. Robbins did not try to 
contact anyone because he didn't know who owned the home. He could not address the traffic 
because the house in question faces 9400 South. Mr. Robbins stated that he didn't know if there 
were any drugs involved, but there were plenty of beer cans. 
Annette Hathenbruck, 1421 Longdale Drive, stated that many of her neighbors were not noticed and 
did not know about the meeting. She stated that Mr. Collins is living in the house now, but if he 
moves they are worried it will be another rental. 
Mr. Collins, owner of the rentals, stated that the car accident which was mentioned happened with 
a long-term renter and that he was not notified—he found out from a neighbor. Alan Walsh asked 
Mr. Collins what the average length of stay would be for renters; during the ski season. Mr. Collins 
replied that it was usually one to two weeks. He stated that he would appreciate it if the neighbors 
would contact him if they have any problems with renters, both short and long term. When he first 
got into the rental business, he came to Sandy City because he knew other people who were renting 
and he thought it was OK with Sandy City. Mike Corrigan asked Mr. Collins if he asked for a copy 
of the Code when he contacted Sandy City. Mr. Collins stated that he did not get a copy-he just 
talked to the City about it. He feels Sandy City needs to be more specific, in writing, how long a 
person can rent. Bill Roskelley asked Mr. Collins if he had a clause in his contracts addressing 
drugs. Mr. Collins replied that he did not address drugs specifically, just that the renter adhere to 
local laws. Dave Evans asked Mr. Collins about the home which was mentioned that had several 
young boys living in it. Mr. Collins replied that he thought there were eight related young men who 
are married—they are a family of builders who have moved here for the summer. He also stated that 
he did not know if they had other people living there and that he would look into it. -Steve Osborne 
asked Mr. Collins when he purchased each of the four homes in questions. Mr. Collins replied that 
the home on Maison was approximately 1981; Alia Pana, 1990; 9400 South, 1995; and Longdale 
1994 or 1995. He has had them as rentals for a number of years. 
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Dave Evans commented that he felt the intent pf the City ordinance relative to residential zones was 
defined as someone who lives there for housekeeping purposes-becoming part of a neighborhood 
watch, knowing their neighbors, looking out for and being concerned about each other-and doesn't 
see how nightly or short-term rentals meets this definition. The staff has interpreted the ordinance 
to fall within the general intent of a neighborhood and the concern is disregard of accountability. 
Bill Roskelley commented that rentals of apartments or homes usually require a six-month to one 
year lease and that shorter rentals, such as nightly or weekly, were best handled at hotels or motels. 
He feels staff made the right decision. 
Regarding the John Collins Alleged Error request, Bill Roskelley made a motion to uphold the 
City's interpretation of the Code which does not allow short-term rentals in residential zones. 
Larry Bowler seconded the motion. The vote was unanimous in favor of upholding the City's 
decision. 
9. Approval of Minutes 
Mike Corrigan made a motion to approve the June 13,1996 minutes as written. Bill Roskelley 
seconded the motion. The vote was unanimous to approve the June 13 minutes. 
Bill Roskelley made a motion to table the July 11,1996 minutes since there were only three 
Board members at that meeting and all three of those members were not present to approve 
the minutes. Alan Walsh seconded the motion. The vote was unanimous to table the July minutes. 
Bill Roskelley made a motion to adjourn the meeting. Dave Evans seconded the motion. The 
vote was unanimous. Meeting adjourned 11:15 p.m. 
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make the keeping of such a house a crime.1S So an ad-
judication as to the validity of a grant by a city of tho 
privilege of running a lottery, pursuant to a legislative 
act authorizing such grant, while res judicata as to its 
validity under the law as then existing, does not deter-
mine as between the state and those clahninc the privi-
lege under the grant, that the state could not by subse-
quent legislative or constitutional enactment proliibii all 
lotteries including the one previously thus authorized.19 
§714. Subsequently Acquired Title.—'Whenever title is 
put in issue and adjudicated, the judgment is res judicata 
upon this issue in any subsequent action.20 The effect of 
*uch an adjudication must, however, be limited to the 
title or right as it then stood. It is obviously not conclu-
sive as to title and rights subsequently acquired.1 Thus 
where the land claimed by plaintiff was held to belong to 
the state because covered by navigable water, tiic judir-
meni does not bar a new action artcr the land has boon 
uncovered by the lowering or the water and has become 
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§713. Change in the Law,—Though a statute govern-
ing rights of action be made in terms retroactive, it does 
not necessarily deprive a previous judgment, involving 
the same subject matter, of its res judicata effect as be-
tween the parties, in the absence of an intent, clearly 
oxpressed, so to do. Thus where a plaintiff is denied re-
lief for alleged criminal conversation because the common-
law right of action has been abolished by statute, and 
subsequently a repealing statute restores the rirrht and is 
expressly made retroactive, the previous judgment is 
nevertheless a bar to a new action by the plaintiff, there 
being nothing in the repealing act to indicate an intention 
to disturb rights adjudicated under the prior law.8 Gen-
erally, however, a subsequent change in the law applied in 
arriving at the judgment defeats its operation as res judi-
cata so far as dependent upon the continuance of that 
law.0 Thus a denial of the right of a municipal corpora-
tion to issue bonds is not conclusive of that risrht after 
the law croverning the matter has been changed.10 Where 
the invalidity of a contract or claim has been cured by 
legislative act, a prior denial of relief on grounds subse-
quently removed by the curative act is not a bar to new 
action on the claim as validated, since it cannot openue 
airainst subsequently acquired risrht?.11 A denial of the 
right of contingent devisees to take under the will becausv 
they were aliens is not res judicata as to their rights upon 
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the happening of the contingency where their disability 
has in the meantime been removed by legislation.12 If 
the attempt to enforce a contract against a county is de-
feated because of its invalidity and the legislature passes 
a curative act, the judgment is not a bar to a new action. l 3 
Bonds issued by a county in a territory, which were void 
because not authorized by act of Congress, may be made 
valid by a subsequent act of Concre^s. and a judgment 
holding: such bonds invalid is not res judicata as to their 
validity after they have been subsequently thus vali-
dated.14 If a contract, illegal for usury, is subsequently 
validated by legislative act to the extent of the principal 
and lawful interest, a former judgment denying relief 
upon it on the ground of usury is not a bar to a second 
action on the contract as thus validated.1 5 
"Where the ric-bt to relief is denied because of the ab-
sence of any remedy, the judgment does not bar a now 
action after a change in the law providing a remedy.16 
Thus where relief to one claiming the proceeds of prop-
erty escheated to the state was denied because a statute 
providing such relief was prospective in its operation and 
therefore did not cover the case in question, the judgment 
does not bar an action under a subsequent statute afford-
ing relief.17 On the other hand, though the validity of a 
contract may have been adjudicated, in so far as this may 
depend upon the validity of future performance or notion 
under it the judgment is not re< judicata when the law 
has been subsequently so changed that such performance 
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September 29, 1998 
BY FAX TODAY TO 572-9259 
FRANKLIN L. SLAUGH, P.C. 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
880 EAST 9400 SOUTH, SUITE 103 
SANDY, UTAH 84094 
RE: John and June Collins v. Sandy City Corp. 
Dear Frank: 
In response to your inquiry about the City's position in respect to your clients' claim 
that they have a prior non-conforming use and should therefore be able to use their properties 
for short-term rentals, I believe that the principle of issue preclusion makes the decision in the 
district court lawsuit final with respect to Mr. Collins' properties, since it wasn't appealed. 
Please let me know if I misunderstand this, or if you know of any authority contrary to this 
position. 
Anyone who believes he qualifies for short-term rental nonconforming use needs to 
show that the property at issue had residing there a tenant on a short-term lease of less than 30 
days on March 31, 1998, the date that the City moratorium on short-term rentals became 
effective, pursuant to Section 15-24-2 of our Development Code, which provides that a 
nonconforming use may be continued if the use was lawfully existing at the time of the 
enactment or subsequent amendment of this Code. Submissions of evidence in support of a 
nonconforming use may be directed to the Director of Community Development. 
Please let me know if you have any questions about this. 
Sincerely, 
Steven C. Osborn 
Assistant City Attorney 
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November 4, 1998 
BY FACSIMILE TODAY TO J72-9259 AND U.S. MAIL 
Franklin L. Slaugh, P.C. 
Attorney at Law 
880 East 9400 South, Suite 103 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
RE: John and June Collins application for nonconforming use 
Dear Frank: 
I understand that your letter of application for a nonconforming use was recently 
received by the Board of Adjustment, and has been placed on the Board's agenda for 
Thursday, November 12, 1998. Although I haven't seen your letter to the Board, I understand 
it is very brief. I write to remind you that the party requesting a nonconforming use has the 
burden of demonstrating that he is entitled to such use by the submission of evidence, and 
where needed, citation of authority. A mere application without more seems unlikely to 
persuade the Board that a party is entitled to a determination that he qualifies for a 
nonconforming use. I am enclosing our ordinance on nonconforming uses, Chapter 15-24, 
Rev. Ord. of Sandy City for your review. Chapter 15-5 referred to herein deals with the 
Board of Adjustment. 
Please let me know if you have any questions about this. 
Steven C. Osborn 
Senior City Attorney 
Enc: Chapter 15-24, R.O.S.C. on nonconforming uses 
cc: Brok Armantrout 
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NONCONFORMING USES & STRUCTURES 
CHAPTER 15-24 NONCONFORMING USES AND 
STRUCTURES 
15-24-1 Purpose of Nonconforming Use Provisions 
15-24-2 Continuing Existing Uses 
15-24-3 Construction Approved Prior to Ordinance 
15-24-4 Nonconforming Uses, Substitution, Extension, 
Discontinuance, Etc. 
15-24-1 Purpose Of Nonconforming Use Provisions 
It is the purpose of these regulations to control and 
gradually eliminate those uses of land or buildings, which 
although legal at the time of their establishment, do not 
now conform to the use regulations of the district within 
which they are situated. Such uses shall be deemed 
nonconforming uses. Likewise, these regulations are 
intended to control and gradually eliminate buildings 
which, although legal at the time of their erection, do not 
now conform to the height, bulk, and location regulations 
of the zone district within which they are situated. Such 
buildings shall be deemed to be nonconforming buildings. 
Any building or use which was permitted prior to enact-
ment of this Code, but which is designated by this Code 
as a conditional use, shall not be considered 
nonconforming and shall not be subject to the provisions 
of this Chapter. This Chapter is also established to 
control and gradually eliminate sites and lots which were 
legal at the time of their establishment, but no longer meet 
the regulations of the district within which they are 
located. Such sites and lots shall be designated as 
nonconforming sites and lots. 
15-24-2 Continuing Existing Uses 
Except as hereinafter specified, any use, building, or 
structure, lawfully existing at the time of the enactment or 
subsequent amendment of this Code, may be continued, 
even though such use, building, or structure does not 
conform with the provisions of this Code for the district in 
which it is located. Except as otherwise provided by law, 
nothing in this Code shall prevent the strengthening or 
restoring to a safe condition of any part of any building or 
structure declared unsafe by proper authority. 
15-24-3 Construction Approved Prior To Ordinance 
A building, structure, or part thereof which does not 
conform to the regulations of the district in which it is 
situated, but for which a building permit was legally issued 
and construction started prior to the enactment of this 
Code, may be completed in accordance with such plans 
providing work has progressed continuously and without 
delay. Such building or structure shall be deemed to be 
nonconforming and shall be subject to the regulations set 
forth herein. 
15-24-4 Nonconforming Uses, Substitution, Exten-
sion, Discontinuance, Etc. 
Unless otherwise approved by the Board of Adjustment, 
a nonconforming use shall not be enlarged, extended, or 
changed unless the use is changed to a use permitted in 
the district in which it is located, and a nonconforming 
building shall not be reconstructed or structurally altered 
unless such alteration shall result in removing those 
conditions of the building which render it nonconforming, 
except as follows: 
(a) Substitution or Extension. 
(1) When authorized by the Board of Ad-
justment in accordance with this Code, a 
nonconforming use which is determined to be of a 
more desirable nature may be substituted for another 
nonconforming use or more closely meets the 
standards set forth in this code. 
(2) Whenever a nonconforming use has been 
changed to a conforming use such use shall not 
thereafter be changed to a nonconforming use. 
(3) Repairs and structural alterations may be 
made to a nonconforming building provided that the 
floor space of such building is not increased. (Refer 
also to requirements of Chapter 22, Site Plan 
Review.) 
(4) A building or structure lacking sufficient 
automobile parking space in connection therewith as 
required by this ordinance may be altered or 
enlarged provided additional automobile parking 
space is supplied to meet the requirements of this 
ordinance for such alterations or enlargement. 
(5) In the event a nonconforming building or 
structure is damaged or partially destroyed by 
calamity or act of nature to the extent of not more 
than one-half (1/2) of its market value, the occupancy 
or use of such building structure or part thereof which 
existed at the time of such partial destruction may be 
continued or resumed provided that restoration is 
started within a period of one year and is diligently 
pursued to completion. In the event such damage or 
destruction exceeds one-half (1/2) of its market value 
of such nonconforming building or structure, no 
repairs or reconstruction shall be made, except in the 
case of residences or accessory farm buildings, 
unless every portion of such building or structure is 
made to conform to all regulations for new buildings 
in the district in which it is located, as determined by 
NONCONFORMING USES & STRUCTURES 
the Chief Building Official, and other requirements as 
may be imposed at site plan review. 
(6) Application for substitution, enlargement or 
extension of a nonconforming use as provided in this 
Section shall be made and considered in the manner 
set forth in Chapter 15-5, Board of Adjustment. 
(7) A vacant building or structure may be 
occupied by a use for which the building or structure 
is designed or intended if so occupied within a period 
of one year after the use became nonconforming. 
(b) Cessation of Use. A use shall be deemed to 
have ceased when it has been discontinued for a period 
of one year or more, whether or not the intent is to 
abandon said use. 
(c) Nonconforming Lot (See Section 15-5-3H) 
Tab 7 
Board of Adjustment Minutes 
November 12,1998 
THOSE PRESENT: Larry Bowler, Chairman; Dave Evans, Allan Walsh, Bill Roskelley, Dave 
Winnie, Members; Mike Corrigan, Laurie Olsen, Alternate Members; Ken Reber, Planning 
Commission; Dennis Tenney, City Council; Steve Osborn, City Attorney's Office; Brok Armantrout, 
Lonnie Crowell, Planning Staff; Sandy Ferderber, Secretary 
1. Arnold Stringham Variance Request BOA #98-36 
1946 East Wasatch Boulevard 
Arnold & Martell Stringham, who own or control property located at 946 East Wasatch Boulevard, 
which is located in the R-l-12 zone, have filed a request with the Sandy City Board of Adjustment 
for a variance from Section 15-14-6(b)(l) of the Sandy City Development Code. The applicant is 
requesting to construct a new home upon a slope that exceeds 30%. Ordinance requires that all 
homes be constructed on slopes less than 30%. This is the last lot within the Hickory Valley Estates 
#1 Subdivision on Wasatch Boulevard to be built upon that backs onto the Hidden Valley Golf 
Course. 
771/5" item was withdrawn by the applicant and will not come before the Board again. 
2. John and June Collins Non-Conforming Use - Request to Establish Alleged Error 
Request 
9255 South Maison Drive BOA #98-37 
1875 East Alia Panna Way BOA #98-38 
472 East 9400 South BOA #98-39 
Franklin L. Slaugh, 880 East 9400 South, Sandy, is the attorney for John and Joan Collins, who 
own or control properties located at 9255 South Maison Drive, 1875 East Alia Panna Way and 472 
East 9400 South which are located in the standard R-1 -(x) zones in Sandy City, filed a request with 
the Sandy City Board of Adjustment that non-conforming land use status be granted to the above 
properties to operate the land use defined as "Residential Lease, Short Term". The Revised 
Ordinances of Sandy City require all requests for determination of non-conforming status be 
reviewed by the Board of Adjustment. The land use "Residential Lease, Short Term'1, is also 
commonly referred to as "Ski Rental", which generally refers to the rental of residential properties 
for a short term that is less than thirty (30) consecutive days. In July 1996. John and Joan Collins 
filed an appeal to the Sapdy City Board of Adjustment from a staff determination that they were not 
allowed to rent the above properties and a property located at 1456 East Longdate Drive, in Sandy, 
as rental units to the public on a nightly or weekly basis. The Sandy Board of Adjustment 
determined that the staff determination was not in error. The Collins appealed the decision to the 
Utah Third District Court for Salt Lake County. The court ruled in October, 1997, that the decision 
of the Board of Adjustment was not an error. The court's decision was not appealed 
Brok Armantrout, Zoning Administrator, presented the staff report. He noted that the applicant is 
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requesting a determination that he has a legal right to use these properties for residential short term 
leases , sometimes referred to as "ski rentals". The legal standard that must be met in order for the 
properties to be used as ski rentals under Sandy ordinances is that the use must have been legally 
established and must have been in operation on the date that the use became illegal, and that the 
use must not have ceased for a period of one year or longer since the date the use became non-
conforming. The date the use became illegal was March 27, 1998, confirmed on March 30 with a 
moratorium, and a subsequent code amendment on September 1, 1998. 
Frank Slaugh,, stilted that the properties in question had been used as uski rentals" for some time 
leading up to a Cease and Desist Order served in March 1996. At that time, the Collins petitioned 
the Board of Adjustment which upheld the City's position. The Collins then petitioned the District 
Court, which upheld the Board of Adjustment decision. The Collins' position is that the Cease and 
Desist order was not lawful and that they were entitled to use the properties as short-term leases at 
that point in time, and feel that they cannot be 
legally penalized for having obeyed the Cease and Desist order. Therefore, they had a continuous 
prior existing use which meets the requirements of Section 15-24-2 of the Sandy Development Code, 
and feel the Board of Adjustment should allow the use to be grandfathered. Dave Winnie asked 
Steven Osborn, Senior City Attorney , if it was determined that the Cease and Desist order was 
unlawful. Mr. Osborn replied that the Court of Appeals had determined in the Brown case that the 
City's interpretation of its ordinances to prohibit leases of less than 30 days had been ruled unlawful 
, but the Third District Court decision upholding the Board of Adjustment decision in the Collins 
case was not appealed, and therefore, it was ruled proper and remains in effect against the Collins. 
Mr. Winnie asked if the Brown case set a precedent in the Collins case or if they were separate 
issues. Mr. Osborn stated that they are the same issue but are separate parties and each party is 
bound by a final decision of the court. Mr. Slaugh stated that the Court of Appeals decision 
invalidated Sandy City's interpretation of the ordinance which would apply to the Collins as well 
as to anyone else—the decision is not limited to the parties in that case. He said his clients are 
included in the Brown decision. Dave Evans asked Mr. Slaugh when the Collins ceased using the 
property as a nightly rental. Mr. Slaugh replied it was March 1996 when they were served with a 
Cease and Desist order. Mr. Evans asked when the Court of Appeals overturned the Third District 
Court decision in the Brown case. Mr. Slaugh replied that the date was March 26, 1998. Mr. Evans 
asked when the moratorium date [on rentals of single family homes for periods of less than 30 days] 
was imposed. That date was March 27, 1998. Mr. Slaugh stated that their position is that this was 
a valid, prior existing use and that, had it not been for the Cease and Desist order, his client would 
have continued using the properties as short-term rentals through that date. Mr. Evans asked that 
since the Collins felt they had a legal right to use the properties as nightly rentals, what steps were 
taken after the Third District Court decision to enforce that right. Mr. Slaugh replied that they did 
not file a separate appeal, but elected to wait for the outcome of the Brown appeal, which they felt 
should also cover the Collins case. 
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Allan Walsh asked Mr. Slaugh why he had not appealed the District Court's decision. Mr. Slaugh 
stated that he did not appeal since the Brown decision involved the same issues and felt it should 
cover the Collins case also. There was no point in spending more attorneys fees; the issue was 
already framed. The Browns had preceded the Collins to the Board of Adjustment. The Collins 
therefore simply waited for the Brown case to be decided. Mr. Walsh asked for a clarification as to 
when the moratorium was placed. Mr. Armantrout explained that the effective date was actually the 
day of posting, which was March 27, but the actual Council meeting was March 31. Based on the 
publication of the agenda, the effective date of the moratorium was retroactive to March 27 under 
the pending ordinance doctrine. Dave Evans asked what the City's experience had been with a cease 
and desist order when there is a pending court decision. Mr. Armantrout stated that it would depend 
on the situation. If there is imminent danger to life, safety or welfare, the City would proceed with 
prosecution; if it were an issue of no danger, the City would probably hold off on prosecuting. This 
is the decision of the City prosecutor. Mr. Slaugh stated that his client is a licensed realtor and that 
there could be problems with his license if he violated the law regarding the cease and desist order. 
For this reason, he did not violate the order and, therefore, was not renting the homes when the 
moratorium was put in place, and feels this qualifies him for a legal non-conforming status. He said 
that he had not filed a petition to hold off on the enforcement of the cease and desist order, but 
believed, based on conversations with City staff, that it would not have been agreeable to the City 
to hold off on enforcement. He said his client claims he was legally nonconforming because he was 
following the law. 
Dana Byerly, 1889 East Alia Panna Way, lives directly east of Mr. Collins rental property on Alia 
Panna Way. Mr. Byerly is a licensed realtor who had just purchased his home in July of 1997 and 
stated that he met Mr. Collins when he first moved in. Mr. Collins was moving out and Mr. Byerly 
asked who would be moving into the home. Mr. Collins told him that a couple would be moving 
in. There were actually four couples who moved into the home. The first week they moved into 
the home, there was an extremely noisy party on a Wednesday night, which continued until about 
5:00 a.m. the next morning and kept the Byerly's awake most of the night with the sound of the 
subwoofers, which made it difficult for them to get up and go to work the next morning. There is 
a hot tub in the back yard which was full of young people with a lot of beer, screaming, hollering, 
and laughing. Mr. Byerly noted that this type of activity happened every Wednesday night. He did 
not want to be a bad neighbor, and it was hard to contact the renters, but he told the renters that if 
this type of activity persisted, he would be forced to call the police. 
Mr. Byerly stated that the problem next door was that the occupants of the home changed regularly 
with a constant influx of different individuals living there on nightly rentals. There were a lot of 
laws being broken- a lot of under-age children drinking, a lot of people breaking curfew, a lot of 
noise, and obnoxious behavior. It was difficult for Mr. Byerly to not let his son see what was going 
on in the hot tub, which was quite provocative. New tenants moved in about three weeks ago. There 
was a hot tub party the very first night they moved in, and has been one about every other night since 
then. There are a lot of cars - sometimes ten cars on their narrow street - when there is a hot tub 
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party and a lot of noise late into the night. The people who are in the home are there temporarily 
and are there to party. They are there to ski and party and don't care about the neighborhood. The 
boom boxes are turned up to full volume. Mr. Byerly said he liked his peace and serenity. This is 
a party house to them, he added: an animal house. He added that his neighbors across the street have 
children under five years of age. He said he was worried about allowing the continued short-term 
rentals because of the thefts, vandalism, etc.; these homes are like motels - or brothels, he said. The 
neighborhood, Montana Ranchos No. 2 subdivision, has active restrictive covenants which went into 
effect April 2, 1979, which prohibit noxious activities or nuisances. He stated that Mr. Collins is 
well aware of the covenants, but has opposed them on a number of occasions. When approached 
regarding the problems of the rental home, Mr. Collins has stated he would sue rather than comply 
with the restrictive covenants. Mr. Byerly stated that if nightly rentals are allowed to continue, the 
permanent residents of the neighborhood will totally lose control over who comes and goes in the 
neighborhood. 
Larry Bowler asked Mr. Byerly if he had any documentation substantiating dates and times of when 
and how long the homes was rented. Mr. Byerly did not have any documentation, but would be 
willing to talk to some of the renters and get some documentation. They did not contact the police 
so they did not have any police documentation. Steve Osborn asked Mr. Byerly when they moved 
into the home. Mr. Byerly stated they moved in on June 20,1997. Mr. Osborn asked if anyone lived 
in the home next to him when they moved in. Mr. Byerly stated that Mr. Collins lived there until 
November of 1997. Since that time, the home has always been rented out. Mr. Byerly stated that 
they felt they had been lied to by Mr. Collins since he told the Byerlys a couple was moving into the 
home. There was actually a number of young men who moved in the same day Mr. Collins moved 
out, and the girlfriends of the young men came and went. Some of the young men were there for a 
year, but many moved in and out. Mr. Byerly stated that there were possibly as many as eight 
different renters in and out of the home through the year, both unmarried young men and women. 
He said most of the time there were from two to ten people living there, adding that the rentals were 
very transient. Mr. Byerly read Part B from their restrictive covenants which stated that "no lot shall 
be used except for residential purposes. No building shall be erected, altered, placed or permitted 
to remain on any lot other than one detached, single family dwelling not to exceed two stories in 
height, private garage and carport, for no more than three vehicles. All construction to be up to new 
materials and approved by the Architectural Control Committee." There were more than three 
vehicles and it was not a single family residential use. Mr. Byerly also read from Section 7 regarding 
nuisances. "No noxious or offensive activity shall be carried out upon any lot nor shall anything be 
done thereon which may be or may become an annoyance or a nuisance to the neighbors". Mr. 
Byerly said that John Collins had sued to enforce the restrictive covenants for that subdivision 
previously. Frank Slaugh said he was not prepared to meet the issue of the violations of the 
restrictive covenants. He said he doubted that this was something that the Board of Adjustment 
should hear in the first instance; rather, that the Third District Court has jurisdiction over that. He 
suggested a fact finding inquiry before the matter was decided. Mr. Byerly stated that when his son 
is watching nude women in the hot tub, he considers it an annoyance. The hot tub is not enclosed 
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and is clearly visible from Mr. Byerly's yard. There is no fence blocking the view of the hot tub from 
Byerly's home. The hot tub is about 60 feet from the Byerly home. He said nude men and women 
often are visible sitting on the edge of the hot tub, or walking from the hot tub to the back door of 
the home at night. He also noted that the area was lit. 
Larry Bowler agreed that the noise, nudity and partying would be very offensive, but asked Mr. 
Osborn if this would have any bearing on the Board's decision since they were to determine whether 
or not the homes were legally non-conforming. Mr. Osborn stated that they are not retrying the issue 
as to whether or not nightly rentals were in violations of ordinance at the time, but the issue Mr. 
Byerly has raised is that of private covenants, so the Board needs to determine if the covenants were 
in effect at the time up until March 1998, and if the private covenants were violated. If they were, 
Mr. Collins cannot establish a non-conforming use, at least not on this particular property on Alia 
Panna Way. Allan Walsh asked if it is the responsibility of the Board to determine violation of 
restrictive covenants or whether this was an issue which should go to a court and the Board would 
then use the court's decision to determine a legal non-conforming use. Mr. Osborn was not certain, 
but felt that if it were clear that there is violation of the ordinance, the Board probably could make 
a determination. City Councilman Dennis Tenney stated that his understanding is that the City 
respects and upholds a neighborhood's restrictive covenants and asked if his understanding was 
correct. Mr. Armantrout stated that the City respects the covenants, but is not bound by law to 
enforce them. Mr. Tenney stated that, in his opinion, since the City respects the covenants, the 
Board would have the right to determine a legal non-conforming use based on violation of those 
covenants. Discussion followed as to whether violation of restrictive covenants could influence the 
Board's decision on whether or not the properties were legal non-conforming. Mr. Osborn stated 
that he wras not sure, but felt that the Board would not have to wait for a court decision to make that 
determination. He noted that if the Board had a court decision, it would be easy for the Board to 
make a determination, but in the absence of such, he felt the Board could use evidence regarding 
violation of the covenants and make their decision. 
Steve Osborn asked Mr. Byerly for further details about the nuisances. Mr. Byerly stated that they 
observed nudity and were disturbed by loud noise, loud and vulgar language with frequent use of 
four-letter obscenities with frequent use of the "f k" word, which could be heard through closed 
windows from 10:00 p.m. until about 4:00 in the morning. They could also hear loud music from 
cars coming and going to the property. There was also loud music coming from the rental home. 
Mr. Byerly finally went over and told the people they would call the police if the noise didn't stop. 
Mr. Osborn asked about any other nuisances from the property. Mr. Byerly stated that there is a 
quarter of an acre back lot which has never been maintained by Mr. Collins. He stated that the only 
time it was cleaned was when he took his tractor over and cut the weeds because he was afraid of 
fire. The weeds were thick and about three feet high in the back yard. The yard was never mowed. 
Finally, Byerly had his son mow the lawn. There is also a broken fence which has never been 
maintained. Mr. Byerly stated that there were about 200 quaking aspen shoots grew up to five fee 
tall in the front yard, and the grass in the front yard grew to six or eight inches before matting over 
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and dying. The grass along the fence in the front yard was about one and a half feet tall. The yard 
was not watered. Much of the lawn turned brown, and never looked good. There was a constant 
worry about fire in the weeds, which could then spread to his wood shed, which sits near the property 
line near the rental property. All of this is a violation of the covenants. Mr. Buyerly said that last 
night there was another hot tub party that continued until 1:00 a.m. There were ten cars parked at 
the house. 
Paul Harris, 9225 South Maison, lives next to another of the subject houses owned by Mr. Collins. 
He has lived in his home continuously since Mr. Collins owned the property. To his knowledge, the 
renters in the house had longer leases, possibly nine months to a year. If there was ever a problem 
with the renters and they contacted Mr. Collins, he would not address the problem. Another 
problem they have is that there are high weeds in the back of the house and next to their property 
which have never been cut. Mr. Harris noted that when looking at a travel magazine, he noticed an 
ad about ski houses. When they called about the ad, the phone was answered as ''Collins Rental". 
They called about the ad because they had heard rumors that Mr. Collins was going to rent the house 
as a ski rental. Mr. Harris stated that they have not had as many problems as the Byerlys have, but 
felt the potential is there for the same type of problems if the house is used as a ski rental. He said 
the dogs kept at the property were vicious, were constantly out of the yard, and were terrorized him 
and his wife. When his wife spoke to the renter, the tenant refused to do anything about the 
problem. The people in the home have also allegedly been using drugs. The property on Maison 
is in the same subdivision as the property on Alia Panna and is governed by the same restrictive 
covenants. 
Mr. Siaugh stated that he did not expect the meeting to go as late as it was and apologized that he 
had to leave for another appointment. Dave Evans commented, for the record, that even if Mr. 
Siaugh were to leave the meeting, a decision would most likely be made. Mr. Siaugh understood 
this but had to leave. 
Craig Zimmerman, 1876 East Alia Panna Way, lives directly across from Mr. Collins* property on 
Alia Panna Way. He has six children ranging in age from six to seventeen, and his concern is for 
the safety of his children since short-term renters do not know who to look for. Steve Os-born asked 
if he had been kept awake by loud parties. Mr. Zimmennan stated that people were in and out of 
the house at all hours of the night; they party; and. but he was concerned with the traffic - there are 
speeding cars. 
J. R. Johnson, 1874 Allen Way, lives north of Mr. Collins property on Alia Panna Way. He stated 
that he has no problem with the property being rented on a long-term basis, but does not want to see 
nightly, weekly or monthly rentals which would be totally out of line in a residential neighborhood. 
Mr. Johnson stated that the lawn was not cared for and the weeds in both of Mr. Collins properties 
are extremely high. He said Dana Byerly had cut down the v/eeds because they were a fire hazard. 
Dave Evans made a motion that the subject properties do not qualify as legal non-conforming 
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for the following reasons: 
1. It has not been legally established that there were nightly rentals at the subject 
properties on March 27,1998, the date on which a moratorium was placed by Sandy 
City; 
2. The applicant already presented to this Board whether or not these properties would 
qualify for nightly rentals and the Board determined that they did not. That decision 
was upheld by the Third District Court, and the applicant did not appeal that decision; 
3. The applicant also did not seek a stay of the Cease and Desist Order which they claim 
deprived them of their alleged legal right to have nightly rentals; 
4. The counsel that the Board is receiving from their legal counsel is that the Brown 
reversal by the Appellant Court has no bearing on the Collins case and that the 
applicant does not have the right to dove-tail his case on the appeal of the Brown case 
and reap benefits from such; 
5. The Cease and Desist letter does not deny the applicant anything nor does it treat the 
applicant differently than any other Sandy City resident; 
6. In order to grant a legal non-conforming use, the use must be legal at the time the 
moratorium was put in place, and because of the many complaints of neighbors, the 
Board has strong reason to believe the use may not be legal; 
7. The property was not in operation as a rental of less than 30 days on March 27,1998. 
8. Short-term rentals of the properties ceased for more than a year in any case. 
Mr. Evans added that the applicant left the meeting early and by doing so waived his right to 
present any evidence to rebut. 
Bill Roskelley seconded the motion. Steve Osborn stated that it might be better to frame a motion 
simply on the issue of whether or not the Board believes the applicant qualified for non-conforming 
use and that findings may not be appropriate for the motion. The motion and second were 
withdrawn. 
Dave Evans made a motion that, based on evidence presented at this meeting, the subject 
properties are not legal non-conforming uses as short-term rentals since they were not rented 
on March 27,1998 and. Mr. Evans also requested that Steve Osborn prepare findings of fact. 
Dave Winnie seconded the motion. The vote was as follows: Dave Evans, yes; Dave Winnie, yes; 
Bill Roskelley, yes; Allan Walsh, no; Larry Bowler, yes. Motion passed 4-1. 
Allan Walsh explained that even though he does not like the concept of ski rental homes in Sandy, 
his concern was that the Board was sending a message that a citizen could be legal by not obeying 
a Cease and Desist order, and also that he does not believe the Board has the jurisdiction to decide 
whether or not private covenants have been violated. He would have preferred to wait to decide the 
case. 
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Dave Winney commented that the Applicant could have appealed the decision of the Third District 
Court but didn't for monetary reasons. 
Dennis Tenney of the City Council said that he is deeply concerned about these properties. 
3. M & M Meats Special Exception Request 
9247 South State Street BOA #98-42 
Richard Rose, who is an authorized representative for M & M Meats, who owns or controls property 
located at 9247 South State Street, which is located in the RC zone, has filed a request with the 
Sandy City Board of Adjustment for a special exception, as permitted under Section § 15-24-4(a)(l) 
of the Sandy City Development Code. The applicant is requesting to reconstruct and relocate an 
existing non-conforming pylon sign. To expand or modify the legal non-conforming (grandfathered) 
sign and replace it with a substitute sign that is more conforming, the applicant is required to obtain 
a special exception The sign is legal non-conforming because it is a pole sign. Ordinance limits 
all signs for similarly situated businesses to be a low-profile (monument) sign with a maximum 
height of six (6) feet. If the request is granted, the sign will be relocated to the north end of the lot, 
have a substantial pole cover, and an upgraded cabinet. The overall size or height of the sign will 
not increase. 
Brok Armantrout presented the staff report. Allan Walsh stated that he understood the City's desire 
to move away from monument signs, but asked if the City would be amenable to a cabinet sign with 
changeable copy. Mr. Armantrout stated that a variance would be required to have changeable copy 
mounted to the wall, and that this would be a viable option. Dave Evans asked if a decision for 
changeable copy could made at this meeting. Mr. Armantrout stated that the request was noticed for 
relocation of a pylon sign, so this item would need to be re-noticed. Mr. Walsh asked if the fee could 
be waived if the item needed to be tabled. Mr. Evans asked if it were true that the front portion of 
the property had been taken when State Street was widened. Mr. Armantrout stated that it was, but 
that it was at least ten years ago or more. Larry Bowler asked if a cabinet sign could be placed on 
both the north and south sides of the building since the applicant was concerned about visibility of 
the sign to northbound traffic. Mr. Armantrout replied that it could. 
Robert Jensen, co-owner of M & M, stated that because of all the trees growing along the canal, no 
one can see the building until they are on top of the building. He noted that Mr. Armantrout 
suggested moving the fence, but they can't do that without considerable cost. They also need the 
turning space for large trucks coming into the store, and moving the fence would reduce the 
employee parking in order to allow enough room for the trucks. If they were to mount signs on the 
building, the cost would be doubled. They have been mostly a restaurant supplier, but they are going 
to appeal more to the general public and would like to be more visible for them. The existing sign 
looks terrible and they realize they need to make it look better. Larry Bowler asked if any attempt 
had been made to contact the canal company and have them prune the trees so the building would 
